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When states restrict
restrict health
health services
services for disabled residents
residents to
providing equally
equally effective
effective
institutional settings instead of providing
institutional
Americans with
community-based services, they run afoul of the Americans
community-based
1999
Disabilities
Act (ADA).'
(ADA).I This was the essential holding of the 1999
Disabilities Act
2
decision
Considered a landmark
landmark civil
civil rights decision
case of Olmstead v. L. C?
C. Considered
3
for residents who have disabilities,
restrictive
disabilities/ Olmstead held that restrictive
treatment
treatment regimes that confine the disabled
disabled to institutional settings
without medical
segregation that the
medical justification
justification constitute a form of segregation
4
ADA, states have
have a general obligation
obligation to
ADA prohibits. Under the ADA,
ADA
appropriate to
provide services in the "most integrated setting" appropriate
disabled
avoid reliance 5upon excessive
disabled individuals, and to avoid
health programs.
their
in their health
institutionalization policies in
programs. 5
institutionalization
Board of Education
Olmstead has been heralded as the Brown v. Board
Olmstead
Education
psychiatric hospitals,
for people with disabilities residing in state psychiatric
analogy
institutions for mental retardation,
retardation,66 and nursing homes.77 The analogy
Law, J.D.
1992 and
from New
University School
J.D. graduated
graduated from
Elliott Schwalb,
Schwalb, J.D.
•* Elliott
New York
York University
School of
of Law,
J.D. 1992
and is
is aa
New York and Georgia Bar. The views expressed
author's alone,
alone,
expressed in this article are the author's
member of the New
and do not necessarily represent the views of any other entity or agency. This article is dedicated
dedicated to
personal
Celeste Saul
Saul Jenks, Genrgia
University College
Col1ege of Law (Class of 2003), who, through her personal
Georgia State University
Celeste
example, inspired her many friends and col1eagues
colleagues throughout her brief life; and to Meg. This article
following individuals:
was greatly enhanced by the generous efforts and insightful comments of the fol1owing
Randall Hughes, Steven Schwartz and John Bayne.
Therese M. Day, Elisa Roberts, Professor Randal1
Therese
(2006)).
12101, et seq. (2006».
(1990) (codified
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12101,
104 Stat. 327 (1990)
1. Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104
1.
581 (1999).
(1999).
Olmstead v. L.C., 527 U.S. 581
2. Olmstead
3. See,
See, e.g., Mary C. Cereto, Olmstead: The Brown v. Board of Education
Education for Disability
Disability Rights:
PuB. iNT.
INT. L. 47 (2001); Melody Kubo, Case Note, Implementing
Promises,
and Issues,
Issues, 3 loY.
LOY. J. PuB.
Promises,Limits,
Limits, and
Lists for Medicaid
Paced Wait Lists/or
Plansfor Reasonably
Reasonably Paced
Olmstead
Defining "Effectively Working" Plans/or
Olmostead v. L.C.: Defining
L. REv. 731 (200
(2001).
HAW. L.
Waiver Programs,
Programs,23 U. HAw.
I).
Home and
and Community-Based Services Waiver
4. Olmstead,
Olmstead,527 U.S. at 600-01.
4.
Id.at
at581,607.
5. Id.
581, 607.
the Mentally
[Intermediate Care Facilities for the
as "ICF-MRs"
"ICF-MRs" [Intermediate
6. Often denoted as
Mental1y Retarded].
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to Brown may be particularly apt in that, like Brown, the actual
progress in deinstitutionalization
deinstitutionalization of health facilities has fallen far
progress in
short of its initial promise. 88 One primary reason that progress
deinstitutionalization has stalled
itself
deinstitutionalization
stalled arises from outside the ADA itself
and relates to Medicaid's community-based
community-based waiver
waiver program, a
primary mode of health care relied upon by disabled individuals.
Medicaid's community-based
community-based waiver program is a service that allows
Medicaid's
individuals
individuals qualifying for institutional care under Medicaid to receive
their care in their homes or in the community as an alternative. The
current state of the law has largely been shaped by a case that arose in
the Federal
Hawaii, 9 Makin v. Hawaii,
Federal District Court in Hawaii,9
Hawaii, the subject of
of
this article. Makin has had a substantial persuasive
persuasive impact that has
limited
community-based
Medicaid's community-based
limited the growth
growth of services under Medicaid's
waiver
waiver program and stymied the nation's deinstitutionalization
deinstitutionalization
efforts. The analysis and holding of Makin
Makin has received
received strong
support from a number
number of subsequent decisions from across the
country, including federal appellate decisions in four circuits, without
10
any explicitly
explicitly contrary decisions.
decisions.1O
This article seeks to show that,
Makin's analysis is
despite reflecting
reflecting the current state of the law, Makin's
ultimately
unpersuasive and its analysis and holding should be
ultimately unpersuasive
rejected.
V. HA WAii
I. THE MAKIN v.
WAII DECISION

A. Background
FactualContext
Background and Factual
In terms of complexity
complexity and cost, Medicaid stands apart from the
other programs that made up President
President Johnson's
Johnson's "Great Society"
7.
Samuel R. Bagenstos,
Bagenstos, Justice
7. Cereto, supra
supra note
note 3; Samuel
Justice Ginsberg
Ginsberg and the Judicial
Judicial Role in Expanding
"We the People":
"We
People": The Disability
Disability Rights Cases,
Cases, 104 COLUM.
COLUM. L. REV.
REv. 49
49 (2004).
8. K. Charlie
Initial
Charlie Lakin,
Lakin, Robert Pouty, Barbara
Barbara Polister && Kathryn Coucouvanis, States' Initial
Freedom Initiative:
Deinstitutionalizationin 30 Years,
Years,
Response to the President's
President's New Freedom
Initiative: Slowest Rates of Deinstitutionalization
42
RETARDATION 241
42 MENTAL RETARDATION
241 (2004).
(2004). The
The New
New Freedom
Freedom Initiative, promulgated under
under Executive
Executive
Order
"swift implementation
Order 13217, directed the
the Executive branch
branch toto undertake "swift
implementation of
of the
the Olmstead
decision."
HospitalCensus After
decision." Id.; Mark S. Salzer, Kat Kaplan && Joanne
Joanne Atay, State Psychiatric
Psychiatric Hospital
After the
Evidence of
DeceleratingDeinstitutionalization,
SERVICES
Decision: Evidence
of Decelerating
Deinstitutionalization, 57
57 PSYCHIATRIC
PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES
1999 Olmstead Decision:
1501 (2006).
9.
9. Makin
Makin v.v. Hawaii,
Hawaii, 114 F.F. Supp. 2d
2d 1017 (D.
(0. Haw. 1999).
infra notes
10. See infra
notes 42-44.
42--44.
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Conceived as an "anti-poverty"
"anti-poverty" program, today Medicaid
program. Conceived
Medicaid is
infrastructure, where access to
a key pillar of the nation's health infrastructure,
insurance is often tantamount to access to any health care at
health insurance
all. In a country where 20 percent
percent of the population
population lacks any
Medicaid
insurance, many health institutions are vitally dependent on Medicaid
services.llII Medicaid
as a funding source for their services.
Medicaid is jointly financed
by state and federal governments, with the federal share
share ranging from
50 to 83 percent, depending on the particular
particular state's per capita
income
average.'122 There are basic federal
income relative to the national average.
rules and requirements under Medicaid law, but states have great
discretion
discretion as to the specific services that will be covered, what
population groups will be covered, and most of the operating
operating details
of the program. Medicaid is an entitlement program, requiring
requiring states
to provide
provide care
care to all who meet its terms of eligibility as a condition
for the receipt of federal funds. The operating language
language for this
entitlement,
entitlement programs of the Social Security
entitlement, like other entitlement
requirement
that such services
services must be furnished
Act, is the statute's requirement
13
promptness."
"reasonable
with "reasonable promptness.,,13
Medicaid
Medicaid funding is a crucial component to realizing the
deinstitutionalization
de institutionalization objectives of the ADA, as interpreted
interpreted by
Olmstead, because
Olmstead,
because it provides
provides the lion's share of the state's health
expenditures
individuals who have permanent
expenditures for individuals
permanent disabilities (as
defined by the Social Security
Security Act). Justice Ginsburg's plurality
Olmstead recognized
opinion in Olmstead
recognized that state health resources
resources "are not
4
Olmstead, states have some latitude
latitude in how they
boundless.,,14 Under Olmstead,
boundless."'
infrastructure to meet the ADA's
ADA's
structure their health care infrastructure
requirements.
Taking
into
account
issues
of
cost,
fairness,
and
the
requirements.
account
overall health needs of their populations, states are permitted to defer
11.
II.

AUDRA
WENZLOW, DAN
FINKELSTEIN, BEN
SHEPPERSON, CHRISTINE YIP
AUORA WENZLOW,
DAN FINKELSTEIN,
BEN LE COOK,
COOK, KATHY SHEPPERSON,
YIP &

BAUGH, THE
ExTRACT CHARTBOOK
13 (2007),
available at
DAVID BAUGH,
THE MEDICAID
MEDICAID ANALYTIC
ANALYTIC EXTRACf
CHARTBOOK 13
(2007), available
http://www.cms.hhs.govfMediaidDataSourcesGenlnfo/downloadslMAXChartbook_2007.pdf
(finding
http://www.cms.hhs.govlMedicaidDataSourcesGenInfo/downloadsIMAX_Chartbook_2007 .pdf (finding
in 2002 that eighteen percent of the U.S. population was covered by Medicaid
Medicaid and
and that Medicaid
accounted for
for fifteen percent
of health
health expenditures).
accounted
percent of
expenditures).
12. 42 U.S.C.
U.S.C. § I1396d(b)
396d(b) (2006).
(2006).
13. 42
42 U.S.C.
1396a(8) (2006);
Sch. &
Hosp. v. Halderman,
Halderman, 451
451 U.S.
U.S. 1,
13.
U.S.C. § 1396a(8)
(2006); see, e.g.,
e.g., Pennhurst
Pennhurst State
State Sch.
& Hosp.
I,
(1981)) (distinguishing a general
17-18 (1981
general federal grant
grant program from an
an entitlement
entitlement program such as the
the
former AFDC
AFDC [Aid
Dependent Children]
Children] program.).
program.).
former
[Aid to
to Families
Families with
with Dependent
(1999).
14. See Olmstead
Olmstead v.v. L.C.,
L.C., 527 U.S. 581,603-07
581, 603-{)7 (1999).
DAVID
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immediate
community-based services. 1155 Approximately
immediate access to community-based
Approximately 64
percent of individuals with disabilities that are severe
severe enough to
16
care. 16
health care.
Medicaid for
on Medicaid
prevent them from working rely
rely on
for their
their health
The principal Medicaid
Medicaid program that finances community-based
community-based care
is the Medicaid home and community-based
community-based waiver program (the
17
"waiver
program").
However,
"waiver program,,).17 However, not
not everyone who qualifies for these
Makin decision,
services gets them, which is in part the result of the Makin
its analysis, and other courts that have followed it.
1981, the waiver program authorizes
authorizes individuals
Established in 1981,
institutional care to receive,
qualifying for institutional
receive, as an alternative, a
panoply of medical and personal services in their homes or other
other
residential
generally
residential settings in the community. Waiver
Waiver services are generally
cheaper and more individually
individually focused than services provided
provided in
18
8
program represents a "waiver"
institutions or nursing facilities.1
facilities. The program
of the general federal requirement that federal Medicaid funds be
"medical assistance,"
limited to services
services provided for "medical
assistance," as defined in
19
19
recognized that such non-medical
non-medical assistance
assistance
the statute. Congress recognized
20
institutional
medical
costly
more
avoiding
to
key
the
could be
more costly medical institutional care.
care. 20
In what has been somewhat confusing, the legislation providing
providing for
"waived" specific statutory provisions of the
the waiver program also "waived"
Medicaid Act, a key part of the analysis below.
Typically,
Typically, when states seek federal approval for a waiver program,
they set forth the maximum
maximum number
number of people who will be served at
15.
IS. This
This point
point was separately
separately emphasized inin J. Kennedy's
Kennedy's concurrence. Olmstead,
Olmstead, 527
527 U.S. at 608
(Kennedy, J., concurring).
concurring).
16. U.S.
U.S. CENsus
PERSONS WITH
WORK DISABILITY
SELECTED CHARACTERISTICS,
CHARACTERISTICS,
16.
CENSUS BUREAU,
BUREAU, PERSONS
WITH WORK
DISABILITY BY
BY SELECTED
TABLE
(search "persons
TABLE 541
541 (2005),
(2005), http://www.census.gov
http://www.census.gov(search
"persons with work
work disability
disability table
table 541"; then
then follow
hyperlink).
hyperlink).
1396n(c) (2006).
17. 42
42 U.S.C.
U.S.C. § 1396n(c)(2006).
Medicaid Home
18. Charlene
Charlene Harrington,
Harrington, Terrance Ng, H. Stephen Kaye && Robert J. Newcomer, Medicaid
and Community Based Services:
Services: Proposed
ProposedPolicies
Policies to Improve Access,
19 PUB.
PuB.
Access. Costs,
Costs. and Quality,
Quality, 19
POL'Y
15 (2009) (finding waiver
were $44,000
$44,000 per
POL'y && AGING REP.
REp. 13, IS
waiver services expenditures were
per person
person
lower
lower than Medicaid
Medicaid institutional spending
spending inin 2002).
2002).
19. 42
42 U.S.C.
U.S.C. § 1396a (2006) sets forth aa number of
of services that
that are defined
defined as
as "medical
assistance."
assistance. "
REP. No.
20.
(1981), reprinted
reprinted in 1981
20. S.S.REp.
No. 97-139, at 481
481 (1981),
1981 U.S.C.C.A.N.
U.S.C.C.A.N. 396,
396, 747-48.
747-48. ("Certain
associated
associated services are not eligible
eligible for
for federal matching
matching payments.
payments. However,
However, these
these services,
services, while not
strictly medical inin nature, may
may in fact contribute to improved
improVed health and
and could
could potentially
potentially postpone
postpone or
prevent
institutionalization. To
prevent institutionalization.
To the
the extent
extent that institutionalization
institutionalization isis deferred
deferred or
or avoided, certain cost
savings may result.").
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anyone
part of the program,
program, often
often called
called "slots."
"slots." An
any
one time as part
individual receiving
receiving a "slot"
"slot" is assessed
assessed for services
services and based
based on
on the
individual
assessment, is provided
provided a specific
specific set of services
services determined
determined
21
necessary for him or her
her to reside
reside safely
safely in the
the community.
community?1
There
necessary
generally two types of waivers. The
The more common waivers are
are generally
applicable to broader
broader populations,
populations, such as the elderly, disabled
disabled and
and
applicable
22
22
of
what
question
the
It
was
disabilities.
developmental
question
what
those with developmental
of
applicable to these
these waiver programs
programs that was the subject
subject of
limits are applicable
There are also
also "model
"model waivers,"
waivers," that are often referred
referred to as
Makin. There
demonstration programs,
programs, designed
designed for individuals
individuals with specialized
specialized
demonstration
diseases and conditions
conditions that are expensive
expensive to treat, such as
those for
23
23
injuries.
cord
spinal
and
brain and spinal cord injuries.
individuals who have severe
severe brain
individuals
24
1991 ADA,
Although
Although Olmstead
Olmstead was decided under the 1991
ADA,24
a general
consensus had been brewing for decades before in the health industry
consensus
institutionalization as 25a
disfavoring institutionalization
and in the civil rights community
community disfavoring
of patients.
interests of
the
subordinated the interests
skewed treatment
treatment regime that subordinated
patients. 25
Interestingly, the waiver
waiver program itself was passed by
by the new
Interestingly,
Congress launched
launched into office with the Reagan administration. It was
efficiency reform as for any
enacted as much as a cost-savings and efficiency
other reason, as evident in the brief description of the program
program in the
Conference Report accompanying
accompanying the legislation:

1017, 1021-22 (D.
F. Supp.
Supp. 2d
2d 1017,1021-22
114 F.
Makin v.
21. See Makin
v. Hawaii,
Hawaii, 114
(D. Haw.
Haw. 1999).
1999).
21.
http://www.cms.hhs.gov/MedicaidStWaiv
22. See Centers
Centers for
for Medicare && Medicaid
Medicaid Services, http://www.cms.hhs.govlMedicaidStWaiv
ProgDemoPGII05_HCBSWaivers-SectionI915(c).asp
(last visited
visited Feb. 8, 2010).
ProgDemoPGI/05_HCBSWaivers-Sectionl9l5(c).asp (last
99-CV-558-SM, 2006
remanded to No. 99-CV-558-SM,
2002), remanded
23. Bryson
308 F.3d
F.3d 79,
79, 83
83 (1st
(1st Cir.
Cir. 2002),
2006
v. Shumway,
Shumway, 308
23.
Bryson v.
(D.N.H. Sept.
WL
2805238 (D.N.H.
Sept. 29,2006).
29, 2006).
WL 2805238
(1990) (codified at 42
Disabilities Act, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat.
with Disabilities
24.
Stat. 327
327 (1990)
24. Americans
Americans with
12101, et seq.
seq. (2006)).
U.S.C. § 12101,
U.S.C.
(2006».
of
25. Judicial decisions reviewing
25.
reviewing the harms of institutionalization
institutionalization and questioning the authority of
constitutional principles and federal statutory law
residents under
under constitutional
states
law span
their residents
to institutionalize
institutionalize their
states to
as the
latest incarnation in this now multi-decade
be seen
seen as
several
may be
the latest
decision may
The Olmstead
Olmstead decision
decades. The
several decades.
v. Romeo,
Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982); Pennhurst State Sch. &
Youngberg v.
See, e.g., Youngberg
trend.
& Hosp.
Hosp. v.
trend. See,
Cohen, 794
794 F.2d 79 (3d Cir. 1986); Wyatt v. Stickney, 325
Halderman,
Clark v.v. Cohen,
325
U.S. I,
1, 17
17 (1981);
(1981); Clark
451 U.S.
Halderman, 451
v. Aderholt,
Wyatt v.
F.F. Supp.
Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1975);
afjd sub nom, Wyatt
Ala. 1971),
1971), affd
781 (M.D.
(M.D. Ala.
Supp. 781
July 24,
24,
(N.D. Okla.
Okla. July
WL 27104
27104 (N.D.
85-C-437, 1987
1987 WL
Ctr., No.
No. 85-C-437,
Mem'l Ctr.,
Inc. v.
v. Hissom
Hissom Mem'l
Homeward
Bound, Inc.
Homeward Bound,
v. L.C.,
L.C., 527
527 U.S. 581,
cf. Olmstead
Olmstead v.
1987);
581,
Tex. 1983);
1983); cf
879 (W.O.
(W.D. Tex.
557 F.
F. Supp.
Supp. 879
Johnson, 557
Thomas v.
v. Johnson,
1987); Thomas
599-{;01
(1999); Frederick
Frederick L.L. v.v. Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 157 F. Supp. 2d 509, 528
528 (E.D. Pa.
Pa. 2001)
599-601 (1999);
Civil Rights'
Rights' report describing a consensus disfavoring institutional care);
on Civil
(citing
U.S. Commission
Commission on
(citing U.S.
Preliminary
and Positive
Positive Rights: A Preliminary
Olnstead, and
Services, Olmstead,
and Community-Based
Community-BasedServices,
Mark C.
C. Weber,
Weber, Home and
Mark
Discussion,39 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 269, 275-78 (2004).
Discussion,
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Committee Amendment - The bill permits the Secretary
Committee
Secretary to waive
the current definition of covered medical services to include
certain
certain nonmedical support services,
services, other than room and board,
which are provided pursuant to a plan of care to an individual
institutionalized and who would, in the
otherwise at risk of being institutionalized
institutionalized Such services
absence of such services, be institutionalized
services
supervised living, home
could include
include case
case management, supervised
services, and nonmedical
rehabilitation
services approved
nonmedical rehabilitation services
approved by the
Secretary .....
Secretary
. . . The committee
committee expects that States which have
cost-efficient
been granted a waiver
waiver will examine
examine innovative
innovative and cost-efficient
26
group.
population
this
to
services
to this population groUp.26
means of rendering

The need and demand for community-based
community-based waiver programs
programs was
apparent from its inception. By 1992, only eleven years later, there
operating in 48 states. 2277 Today it is the
were 153 waiver programs
programs operating
preferred
preferred mode of care for many individuals who previously
previously would
have been left with the choice of institutionalization
institutionalization or going without
without
any care at all.
In the thirty years
years of the waiver's existence, there
there has been a role
of
reversal between
between states and the federal government
government as proponents of
the program's growth. At one time, the federal agency with
administrative
authority over the program, the Health Care Financing
Financing
administrative authority
System [now,
[now, The Centers for Medicaid and Medicare Services
(CMS)]
(CMS)] limited its growth through regulatory initiatives. 2288 It is the
federal government that now seeks to encourage greater use of the
waiver program
generally it is the
program and deinstitutionalization,
de institutionalization, and generally
states that have been reluctant
reluctant to transform
transform their health
29
half
sealed the genie in the bottle in the first half
infrastructure. Having sealed
of the program's
history,
however,
the
federal
government
has
found
program's
it difficult to coax the genie back out.
26. H. R. REP.
(1981), reprinted in 1981
REp. No. 97-208,
97-208, at 481-82
481-82 (1981),
1981 U.S.C.C.A.N. 396,
396, 747-48.
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-03-576,
GAO-03-576, loNG
LONG TERM CARE:
27. GENERAL ACCOUNTING
CARE: FEDERAL OVERSIGHT OF
GROWING MEDICAID
MEDICAID HOME AND
AND COMMUNITY-BASED
COMMUNITY-BASED WAIVERS
WAIVERS SHOULD
SHOULD BE STRENGTHENED
11 (2003).
STRENGTHENED II
28. See infra notes
notes 67-69.
13,217, 66 Fed. Reg. 33,155 (June 18,
2001). A list of current Olmstead29. See Exec.
Exec. Order No. 13,217,66
18,2001).
related lawsuits
lawsuits kept
kept by
by the
the National
Association of State Developmental
related
National Association
Developmental Disabilities
Disabilities Services
Services can be
be
found at http://www.nasddds.org/LitigationUpdates/index.shtml.
http://www.nasddds.orglLitigationUpdateslindex.shtml.
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The key
key case
case authorizing
authorizing states
states to
to limit
limit growth
growth and
and availability
availability of
of
The
community based
based services
services was
was Makin
Makin v. Hawaii,
Hawaii, the first case
case to
to
community
address directly
directly and
and decisively
decisively how, and
and whether,
whether, the waiver
waiver
address
programs must
must follow
follow Medicaid's
Medicaid's general
general requirement
requirement that
that services
services
programs
be provided
provided to
to beneficiaries
beneficiaries with
with "reasonable
"reasonable promptness."
promptness." Makin
Makin
be
with
individuals
of
behalf
arose
a
class
action
brought
on
behalf
of
individuals
on
brought
action
a
class
from
arose
developmental disabilities
disabilities seeking
seeking Medicaid
Medicaid services
services from the state
developmental
through its waiver
waiver program for individuals
individuals with developmental
developmental
through
disabilities. The
The state
state had
had a waiting
waiting list of 801 individuals
individuals two
disabilities.
before the
the court's
court's ruling, without
without any guidance
guidance as to when
when the
months before
30
3
0
services were to be provided. The
The plaintiffs
plaintiffs argued that the waiting
waiting
services
violated Medicaid's
Medicaid's "reasonable
promptness" requirement, but
"reasonable promptness"
list violated
the court
court rejected
rej ected this theory.31
31
court's opinion in Makin has cast a shadow on access to
The court's
persuasive authority,
community-based services,
services, and under its persuasive
community-based
waiting lists for individuals with developmental
developmental disabilities and
waiting
in
most states. 32 A recent study
proliferated
mental retardation have proliferated
study
mental
that-across the countrycountryfound waiting lists in thirty-one
thirty-one states and that-across
some 73,000 individuals were on waiting lists for waiver services,
33
receiving services.
services?3
representing
one-half of those receiving
representing fully one-third to one-half
Generally, these states provide no time-limits
time-limits for how long
individuals
individuals must wait for services
services to be provided, and it is not
uncommon for beneficiaries
beneficiaries to wait for years without getting
of
services, if they get services at all. As noted above, a large number of
as
their
programs
dependent on waiver programs
disabled individuals are dependent
34 Their right to non-institutional care has
principal means of care. 34
subsequent
Makin, and subsequent
effectively been tethered to the holding of Makin,
It is not just the
cases that have followed its analysis. It
developmentally
developmentally disabled that are affected. Today, more people with
physical disabilities, individuals with spinal cord injuries, and the
30.
30.

(D. Haw. 1999).
2d 1017, 1023 (D.
F. Supp.
Supp. 2d
114 F.
Makin v. Hawaii, 114
at 1030--31.
1030-31.
Id.at
31. Id.
18.
et aI.,
al., supra note 18.
32. See Harrington et
FOR INCLUSION
INCLUSION 2007: AN
THE CASE FOR
CEREBRAL PALSY (UCP), THE
33. See TARREN
UNITED CEREBRAL
TARREN BRAGDON, UNITED
16
AND DEVELOPMENTAL
DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES 16
INTELLECTUAL AND
AMERICANS WITH lNTELLECfUAL
ANALYSIS OF MEDICAID FOR AMERICANS
the survey.
survey.
not respond to the
states did
did not
(2007),
http://www.ucp.org/medicaid/fullreport.cfin. Notably, ten states
(2007), http://www.ucp.org/medicaidlfullreport.cfin.
note 16.
16.
supra note
CENSUS BUREAU, supra
34. See U.S. CENSUS
34.
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elderly are
are often
often served
served in waiver
waiver programs
programs at
at home
home for their
their
frail elderly
care than
than in
in hospitals
hospitals or nursing
nursing facilities. 35 Waiting
Waiting lists have
have grown
grown
significantly
significantly in many
many states where individuals
individuals currently
currently residing in
institutions
institutions could
could safely
safely return to homes and communities. Ten
Ten years
after they were challenged
practices of states
challenged in Makin, the practices
wait
lists
is
a
common
occurrence
indefinite
maintaining
maintaining indefinite
occurrence with
Medicaid
Medicaid programs
programs throughout the
the United
United States. This article
article
analyzes
analyzes that decision, and
and questions
questions the
the court's
court's analysis
analysis and
and legal
conclusions.
B. The Current
Current State ofthe Law with Respect to Population
Population Limits
on Waiver Programs
Programs

At issue in Makin was Medicaid's
Medicaid's core
core entitlement
entitlement mandating that
"reasonable promptness."
services to beneficiaries
beneficiaries be provided
provided with "reasonable
promptness."
1396a(a) provides
provides that "[a]
"[a] state plan for
Specifically, 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)
... that such assistance shall be
medical assistance must-(8)
must--(8) provide ...
be
' 36
"
individuals.
eligible
all
to
promptness
furnished with reasonable
reasonable promptness to all eligible individuals. ,,36
The plaintiffs in Makin
Makin alleged that the State was violating
Medicaid's
Medicaid's reasonable
reasonable promptness
promptness provision by maintaining
maintaining a
waiting list for services and not assuring that the services would
would
37
37
actually be provided. The State argued
argued that the waiting list was not
"population limits" in
impermissible because federal law authorized "population
impermissible
38
38
The
court
essentially
agreed
with this analysis:
waiver programs.
essentially
The statute and regulations provide for limits on HCBS-MR
HCBS-MR
services [home and community-based
community-based waiver services
services for the
mentally retarded] and further provide they are not to be
"available" under the statute when the slots are filled.
considered "available"
considered
§ 1396n(c)(2)(C),(c)(9),
1396n(c)(2)(C),(c)(9), (c)(lO);
(c)(10); 42 C.F.R.
See 42 U.S.C. §
§§ 441.303(6). Therefore
Therefore under the statute, the State need not

Fox-GEORGE,
GREGORY, ARI
ARi N. HOUSER
35. See,
JO GmSON,
GIBSON, STEVEN R. GREGORY,
See. e.g., MARY
MARy Jo
HOUSER &
& WENDY FOX-GEORGE,
AARP Pus.
PUB. POL'y
POL'Y INST.,
INST., ACROSS
PROFILES OF LoNG
LONG TERM
AARP
ACROSS THE STATES: PROFILES
TERM CARE (2004).
U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(8)
1396a(a)(8) (2006).
(2006).
36. 42 U.S.C.
2d 1017, 1025 (0.
(D. Haw. 1999).
1999).
Makin v.
v. Hawaii, 114
114 F. Supp. 2d
37. Makin
Id. at 1026.
38. Id.

https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol26/iss3/10
HeinOnline -- 26 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 810 2009-2010

8

Schwalb: Reconsidering Makin v. Hawaii: The Right of Medicaid Beneficiari

20l1
2010)

RECONSIDERING
RECONSIDERING MAKIN
MAKIN V HA
HAWAII
WAH

811

provide
provide services
services to
to new
new "eligible"
"eligible" individuals
individuals until slots become
become
39
39
available.
available.
In
In supporting
supporting its analysis, the court referenced
referenced two instances
instances in
in
which
which the Medicaid
Medicaid statute
statute explicitly
explicitly mentioned
mentioned limits. It found these
provisions
regulations to
provisions ambiguous,
ambiguous, however, and
and it looked
looked to the regulations
resolve the ambiguity:
resolve
Initially, section 1396n(c)(9)
1396n(c)(9) provides that if the State
State program
program
"contains
a
limit
on
the
number
of
individuals
who
shall
shall receive"
receive"
"contains a limit on the number of individuals
HCBS-MR
HCBS-MR services,"
services," the State may substitute additional
individuals
individuals to receive"
receive" the services to replace people who died or
became
1396n(c)(10)
became ineligible
ineligible for them
them Second,
Second, section 1396n(c)(10)
contains
contains a limitation on the Secretary
Secretary regarding
regarding the limits that he
or she may allow a State to place
place on the programs.
programs. It sets a
minimum
HCBS-MR program at 200
minimum number of individuals in a HCBS-MR
people. It is also important to note that there is no language
language in the
statute providing
for
these
"limits"
on
the
ICF/MRs
providing
"limits"
ICFIMRs [institutional
services], suggesting that there is reason to treat the programs
services],
differently. Thus, Congress has provided states with the authority
to set limits on the amount of slots available in an HCBS-MR
program, and at the very least, the statute
statute is ambiguous
"limits" are allowed.
concerning whether "limits"
concerning
Fortunately, the agency regulations clear up any ambiguity or
created. In 42 C.F.R.
doubt that the statute may have created
§ 441.303(6),
the
HCFA
[Health
Care
Finance
441.303(6),
Finance Administration]
states that the State must provide the number of individuals that
it intends to grant HCBS-MR services
services to in each of the years
covered by the waiver application. Then, it states that "this
constitute aa limit
limit on the size of the waiver program"
number will constitute
program"
unless the State requests a greater number and the Secretary
HCFA
A [HHS] approves the
approves it. Once the Secretary of HCF
HCBS-MR
number, it becomes
becomes the "population limit" on the HCBS-MR
services. The court must defer to agency's regulations since it
Id. at
at 1027.
39. Id.
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does not
not contradict
contradict the intent or
or purpose
purpose of
of the
the statute.
statute. Thus,
Thus, it is
the
clear
that
the
Medicaid
statute
and
its
regulations
require
the
require
clear that the Medicaid statute and its regulations
State
provide a number
number to the Secretary
Secretary that will act
act as
as the
State to provide
limit
HCBS-MR program
program every year. As aa result,
limit on the State's HCBS-MR
when
are filled by
by eligible
eligible individuals,
individuals, the HCBS-MR
HCBS-MR
when the slots are
is
no
longer
a
"feasible
alternative"
available
program
longer "feasible alternative" available under the
program
waiver. Stated
Stated differently,
differently, the HCBS-MR
HCBS-MR program
program is not an
an
4o°
4
entitlement.
entitlement.

In
In reaching
reaching its decision,
decision, the
the court relied
relied upon
upon regulation
regulation 42 C.F.R.
authorized to have
§ 441.303 to determine
determine that states were authorized
"population limits."
Once these "population
"population limits" were deemed
limits." Once
"population
proper, the Court effectively
Medicaid statute
effectively read the Medicaid
statute to have made
exception to its reasonable
an implicit exception
reasonable promptness
promptness provision
provision
permitting
permitting states to keep additional
additional Medicaid
Medicaid beneficiaries
beneficiaries
indefinitely unserved
subsequent decisions,
indefinitely
unserved on waiting lists. 4411 Several subsequent
including
including federal appellate
appellate court decisions, have reached the same
same
reasonable promptness
conclusion, finding that the reasonable
promptness provision
provision does not
not
42
eliminate
waiting
lists
for
community
services.
require
states
to
require
services.42
"reasonable promptness"
Some cases
cases find the "reasonable
promptness" requirement
requirement applicable
"population
only to any authorized, but unfilled slots below the "population
limit," but without any legal obligation to increase these limits to
limit,"
43
meet the demands of those on the waiting list. 43
A few mostly preMakin district court cases suggest that the reasonable promptness
requirement
requirement does apply to waiting lists. However, these cases do not
1027-28 (emphasis in original).
40. Id
Id. at 1027-28
41.
Id. at 1028.
41. /d.
42. Arc of Wash. State, Inc. v. Braddock, 427 F.3d 615 (9th Cir. 2005); Bertrand
Bertrand v. Maram, 495 F.3d
F.3d
llinois's adoption of "priority
"priority population criteria" complies with
452 (7th Cir. 2007) (stating that illinois's
(analyzing a
v. Shumway, 308 F.3d 79, 83
83 (1st Cir. 2002) (analyzing
reasonable promptness
reasonable
promptness criteria.); cf Bryson v.
also Brown
requirements than the regular waiver
"model waiver" program, with separate
separate requirements
waiver programs);
programs); see also
& Admin., 561 F.3d 542, 548 n.4 (6th Cir. 2009) (rejecting an anticipated
v. Tenn. Dep't of Fin. &
serve all eligible recipients in the state's waiver
waiver
argument by class Plaintiffs of the obligation
obligation to serve
WL 51271,
51271, at *9
*9 (D. Minn. Jan. 8, 2004)
Masterman v. Goodno, No. 03-2939, 2004 WL
program); Masterman
(asserting without analysis that Congress has allowed states to limit the number of people to be served
under waiver).
Supp. 2d 61,77-79
61, 77-79 (D. Mass. 2000); Lewis v. N.M. Dep't of Health,
43. Boulet v. Cellucci, 107 F. Supp.
see M.A.C.
M.A.C. v.
v. Betit, 284 F. Supp. 2d 1298, 1308 (D.
(D. Utah
275 F.
F. Supp. 2d 1319,
1319, 1343
1343 (D.N.M.
(D.N.M. 2003); see
275
2003).
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of
procedural context. 44 In Arc of
of their procedural
fully analyze
analyze the issue because oftheir
45 the Ninth Circuit
Washington State,
Inc. v. Braddock,
Washington
State, Inc.
Braddock,45
Circuit followed
essentially the same reasoning of Makin
Makin v. Hawaii
Hawaii with a more
essentially
46
Makin decision and its analysis
truncated
truncated analysis. Thus, the Makin
47
represent the current
current state ofthe
of the law.47
represent
Braddock and other post-Makin cases is
The consistency of Braddock
somewhat
Medicaid statute is
somewhat surprising. After all, while the Medicaid
notoriously complex, the plain language of the statute does not
not
notoriously
"reasonable
actually exclude the waiver
waiver program
program from the "reasonable
to
the
reasonable
promptness
The
exception
provision.
promptness"
promptness"
exception
reasonable promptness
interpretation of' a8
requirement
created by the Makin court's interpretation
requirement was created
A
"ambiguous. ,.48
found
it
which
regulation, not statutory provisions
provisions which it found "ambiguous.
authority was there for the
Yet, this raises the question: what authority
§
441.303 so as to create
42
C.F.R.
create the
agency's promulgation
promulgation of
agency's
exception to the statute's "reasonable
promptness" provision?
"reasonable promptness"
exception

44. Michele
Michele P. v. Holsinger, 356 F. Supp. 2d 763, 769-70
769-70 (E.D. Ky. 2005) (denying motion to
to
481 (C.D. III.
I11.
McCrimmon, 807 F. Supp. 475,
475,481
1992)
dismiss reasonable
reasonable promptness claim); McMillan v. McCrimmon,
"reasonable promptness,"
(applying "reasonable
promptness," but not referencing
referencing a population
population cap);
cap); Benjamin
Benjamin H. v. Ohl, No.
15, 1999)
34783552, at *\3
*13 (S.D. W. Va. July IS,
3:99-0338, 1999 WL
1999) (finding
(finding the plaintiffs "likely to
to
3:99-0338,
WL 34783552,
succeed" on reasonable promptness
promptness claim seeking preliminary
preliminary injunction).
45. Arc of Wash. State,
State, Inc. v. Braddock, 427 F.3d 615 (9th Cir. 2005).
2005).
46. The court reasoned:
As an alternative
alternative to institutionalized
institutionalized care for the disabled, the Medicaid statute and
community-based
regulations allow states
states to apply for waiver programs for home
home and community-based
therefore
care. However, Congress
Congress envisioned such programs
programs as limited in scope, and therefore
included
included the following language in 42 U.S.C.
U.S.C. § 1396n(c), the waiver portion of the
(9) In the case
statute: (9)
under this subsection which contains
contains a limit on the
case of any waiver under
number of individuals who shall receive home or community based services, the State
may substitute
substitute additional
additional individuals to receive such services to replace
replace any individuals
(10) The Secretary
Secretary shall
who die or become ineligible for services under the State plan. (10)
not limit to fewer than
than 200 the number
number of individuals in the State who may receive home
and community-based
community-based services under a waiver
waiver under the subsection. The
The regulations
of
implementing
implementing the statute
statute go farther, requiring
requiring states
states to place a limit on the number of
waiver
waiver program participants, and requiring states to adhere to the limitation ....
....
613.
Braddock,
Braddock, 427 F.3d at 6\3.
(summarizing then current cases).
47. See also Kubo, supra
supra note 3, at 755-56 (summarizing
1017, 1027-28 (D.
(D. Haw. 1999).
1999).
Hawaii, 114 F. Supp. 2d 1017,1027-28
48. See Makin
Makin v. Hawaii,
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II. THE
THE LEVEL
LEVEL OF JUDICIAL
JUDICIAL DEFERENCE
DEFERENCE THAT
THAT SHOULD
SHOULD BE
BE ACCORDED
ACCORDED
THE REGULATION
THAT MAKIN
MAKIN HELD
HELD AUTHORIZED
AUTHORIZED POPULATION
POPULAnON
REGULA nON THAT

LIMITS AND ITS
ITS REGULATORY
REGULATORY HISTORY
HISTORY

A.
A. The Standard
Standard of
ofReview
Review for Administrative Agency
Agency Regulations
Regulations
The seminal case on executive
executive agency
agency rule-making,
rule-making, Chevron
U.S.A., Inc.
Natural Resource Defense Council,
Council, generally
generally requires
requires
Inc. v. Natural
courts
executive agencies'
agencies' interpretive
interpretive regulations within
within
courts to defer to executive
their statutorily delegated
delegated authority when
when confronted
confronted with legal
49
49
requires courts
courts to
questions not addressed in a statute. Chevron requires
interpretations if they are within the range of reasonable
sustain such interpretations
reasonable
interpretations.
general rule, and not all agency
agency
interpretations.550° However, this is a general
51
51
interpretations
interpretations are entitled to deference. The Makin court's analysis
overlooked
presuming deference
deference
overlooked an important part of the question by presuming
to CMS's
regulation
42
C.F.R.
§
441.303
without
first
inquiring
into
441.303 without
CMS's
its regulatory
regulatory history
history and fully analyzing
analyzing the level
level of deference to
52
which the regulation
regulation was entitled. 52 Had it done so, that court may
may
have reached a different conclusion.
The first step in the review of agency
agency regulations "is whether
Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue. If the
intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter, for the Court
as well as the agency, must give effect
unambiguously
effect to the unambiguously
53
intent
expressed
of Congress.
Congress.",,53 Where the question is not addressed
addressed
expressed
in the statute, the next step is to determine
determine if Congress
Congress made a
If
agency to fill gaps in the statute. If
delegation of authority for the agency
Congress made such a delegation, "[s]uch
"[s]uch legislative regulations are
given controlling weight unless they are arbitrary, capricious, or
manifestly contrary to the statute.,,54
statute., 54 Such deference
deference under Chevron,
Chevron,
however, is warranted only "when
"when it appears that Congress delegated
delegated
49. Chevron
Chevron U.S.A.,
U.S.A., Inc.
Inc. v. Natural
Natural Res.
Res. Det:
Def. Council,
Council, 467
U.S. 837
(1984).
49.
467 U.S.
837 (1984).
Id.
50. Id.
at 843-44.
51. Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S.
51.
U.S. 243, 256 (2006).
52. Makin, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 1028 ("The
(''The Court must defer to the regulation because it does not
statute.").
contradict the intent
intent and
and purpose of the statute.
"). This assertion is challenged throughout
throughout this article.
article.
Chevron,467 U.S. at 842-43.
53. Chevron,
Id.
844.
54. /d.
at 844.
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authority to the agency generally
of
generally to make rules carrying
carrying the force of
law, and that the agency interpretation
interpretation claiming
claiming deference
deference was
promulgated in the exercise
exercise of that authority. Otherwise the
interpretation
interpretation is entitled to respect only to the extent it has the power
power
55
persuade."
to persuade.,,55
In order for such regulations to have the "force
"force and effect of law"
law"
it is necessary
necessary to establish a nexus between the regulations
regulations and some
delegation
56
delegation of the requisite legislative authority by Congress. 56
Congressional delegations
delegations of authority to regulate need not always
deference to be applied. If there is
be explicitly
explicitly expressed
expressed for judicial deference
no expressed
"interpretive gap"
expressed delegation, an "interpretive
gap" in the statute, along
policy-making authority, can still warrant
warrant
with a delegation of policy-making
57
delegation.
implied
an
as
regulation
a
to
deference
administrative
administrative
to a regulation as an implied delegation. 57
Where
Where the statute is silent on a question and Congress has delegated
delegated
to an agency the authority to promulgate regulations, Chevron
requires that the agency's
reasonable
agency's rule be upheld so long as it is a reasonable
construction
construction most
most
construction of the statute. It need not be the construction
persuasive to a court. Chevron
Chevron and its progeny
progeny recognize that an
persuasive
agency's
agency's specialized experience
experience in a particular
particular area places such
executive
Congressional
executive agencies
agencies in a better
better position to determine 58
Congressional
intent.
that
with
consistent
intent, and the policies most
most consistent with that intent. 58
When there is no delegation, the regulation has only such
such
persuasive
persuasive authority as it derives from the circumstance surrounding
surrounding
"[T]he level of deference
deference will depend upon the
its promulgation. "[T]he
thoroughness
thoroughness evident in its consideration,
consideration, the validity of its
reasoning,
reasoning, its consistency with earlier
earlier and later pronouncements,
pronouncements, and
lacking power to
all those factors which give it power
power to persuade,
persuade, if lacking
59
control., An additional
deference is the degree the
additional factor warranting deference
control.,,59
"necessarily requires significant
subject matter "necessarily
significant expertise and entails
entails

55. Gonzales v. Oregon, 546
546 U.S.
U.S. 243, 256 (2006) (citations and internal
internal quotations omitted).
(1979).
56. Chrysler Corp.
Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281,
281, 304 (1979).
57. Pauley
Pauley v. Beth Energy
Energy Mines,
Mines, 501 U.S. 680, 696 (1991).
(1991).
58. Chevron, 467
467 U.S. at 865.
865.
59. EEOC
EEOC v. Arabian
Oil Co.,
499 U.S.
U.S. 244
(1991) (citing
(citing Gen. Elec.
Gilbert, 429
U.S. 125,
125, 14059.
Arabian Oil
Co., 499
244 (1991)
Elec. v. Gilbert,
429 U.S.
14046
(1976) (quoting
46 (1976)
(quoting Skidmore
Skidmore v. Swift &
& Co., 323
323 U.S.
U.S. 134, 140 (1944))); accord Heimermann
Heimmermann v. First
(11th Cir. 2002).
Union Mortgage Corp.,
Corp., 305 F.3d 1257, 1261 (11th
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60 Finally,
exercise of judgment
judgment grounded
grounded in policy
policy concerns."
concerns.,,60
the exercise
the
even after deference
deference and
and respect
respect are
are accorded,
accorded,
the agency's
agency's
61
61
one.
reasonable
a
least
at
be
still
interpretation
interpretation must
be at least a reasonable one.

B. Did Congress
Congress Delegate
Delegate to the Agency
Agency Authority to Set Limits on
Program?
the Waiver Program?
With
With this standard
standard in mind, what level of deference
deference should
should be
accorded
accorded CMS's
CMS's regulation
regulation 42 C.F.R. § 441.303,
441.303, which
which the Makin
to
establish
strict
population
court
held
authorized
states
court
authorized states establish strict population limits and,
interpretation of the regulation,
consequentially,
consequentially, waiting
waiting lists? This interpretation
Medicaid
the court
court then viewed as authorizing
authorizing the state to avoid
avoid Medicaid
statute's
statute's "reasonable
"reasonable promptness"
promptness" requirement. Is rule 42 C.F.R.
effectively foreclosing
§ 441.303 entitled
Chevron deference,
entitled to Chevron
deference, effectively
judicial
judicial authority to question
question it?
deference is that there
Chevron deference
The first problem in bestowing
bestowing Chevron
delegation to CMS to
does not appear to be a specific statutory
statutory delegation
promulgate
promulgate regulations
regulations in the waiver. The statute
statute provides
provides the
Secretary
Department of Health
Health and Human Services, which
Secretary of the Department
approve waivers (subject to a range
oversees CMS, with authority to approve
of assurances
assurances provided by the state), but does not specifically
specifically provide
United States v. Mead,62
Mead,62 Chevron
Chevron
for rule-making
rule-making authority. Under United
deference
deference does not apply unless Congress intended
intended to delegate such
such
"Chevron deference
authorization
deference ..... . is not accorded
authorization to the agency. "Chevron
merely because
because the statute is ambiguous
ambiguous and an administrative
administrative
official
involved.. . . . [T]he rule must be promulgated pursuant
official is involved.
pursuant to
63 Not only does the
authority
authority Congress has delegated
delegated to the official.,
official.,,63
explicitly delegate to CMS the authority to promulgate
statute not explicitly
Health Review
Review Comm'n,
Comm'n, 499
501 U.s.
U.S. at
at 697
(citing Martin
Martin v.
Occupational Safety
60. Pauley,
Pauley, 501
697 (citing
v. Occupational
Safety &
& Health
499
U.S.
144, 152-53 (1991));
U.S. 144,152-53
(1991»; Aluminum Co. of Am. v.v. Cent. Lincoln
Lincoln People's Util. Dist.,
Dist., 67 U.S. 380,
380, 390
377 (1989).
(1989).
(1984); accord Marsh v. Or.
Or. Natural
Natural Res.
Res. Council,
Council, 490
360, 377
(1984);
490 U.S.
U.s. 360,
61. Gen. Dynamics
Dynamics Land Sys.
Sys. v. Cline,
Cline, 540 U.S. 581 (2004); Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S.
576,
591 (2000)
576, 591
(2000) (Scalia,
(Scalia, 1.,
J., concurring).
concurring).
62. United States v.v. Mead, 533 U.S. 218, 226-27
226-27 (2000).
U.S. at
at 226-27);
226-27); cf
cf Pub.
Pub. L. No.
No.
v. Oregon,
Oregon, 546
546 U.S.
243, 258
258 (2006)
(2006) (citing
(citing Mead,
Mead, 533
63.
U.S. 243,
533 U.S.
63. Gonzales
Gonzales v.
122(g)(2), 96
96 Stat.
Stat. 324,
324, 363
363 (1982)
(1982) ("[T]he
("[T]he Secretary
Secretary of
of [HHS]
[HHS] shall,
not later
later than
than September
September
97-248, §§ 122(g)(2),
97-248,
shall, not
forth-(A) a
a description of the
1, 1983, promulgate such fmal
final regulations as may be necessary to set forth-{A)
I,
'hospice care' and the standards for qualifications ofa
of a 'hospice program'
program'....").
care included in 'hospice
....").
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restricts the
rules under the waiver, in several
several instances
it actually restricts
64
64
states.
to
waivers
Secretary from denying
Secretary
denying waivers to states.
Although in 1935 Congress provided a general
general delegation
delegation of rule
making authority
authority in the Social Security
Security Act (of which Medicaid
Medicaid is a
65 Labor,
Secretaries of Health, Education and Welfare,
part) to the Secretaries
Welfare,65
66
and Treasury, not inconsistent
Act,66
there are several
inconsistent with the Act,
reasons to question this delegation as sufficient
sufficient to bestow Chevron
Chevron
deference
to
CMS's
waiver
regulations.
First,
Medicaid
did
not
exist
deference
at the time of this delegation, and it was in fact forty years before
Chevron itself,
itself, when executive
Chevron
executive authority for rule-making
rule-making was more
circumscribed.
circumscribed Consistent
Consistent with this period, the delegation
delegation is limited
limited
in scope to make rules "necessary
"necessary for the efficient administration
administrationof
of
chapter." 67
this chapter.,,67
charged under
the functions with which each is
is charged
under this
"Efficient
administration" appears more restrictive a delegation
"Efficient administration"
delegation than
other more expansive
expansive legislative
legislative delegations. By contrast, other
statutes have explicitly invited agencies to exercise their discretion
discretion in
authorizing regulations which in the
shaping a program, such as by authorizing
statute; 68
of the
purposes" of
the purposes"
"effectuate the
agency's
agency's "judgment" best "effectuate
the statute;68
or to make rules "necessary
"necessary in the public interest to carry out the
provisions of the Act.,,69
Act." 69 Moreover, since the waiver program's
program's
provisions in 42 U.S.C.
U.S.c. § 1396n waive other parts of the statute, any
any
delegation
delegation ought to be strictly construed to 70avoid becoming
becoming an
70
power.
legislative
of
delegation
unconstitutional
unconstitutional delegation of legislative power.
C.
andIts History
History
C. The Agency's Rationale
Rationale for the Waiver Regulation
Regulation and
Even without an explicit legislative
legislative delegation, the regulation
regulation may
of
still be entitled to deference on the basis of an implied grant of
64. See 42 U.S.C.
64.
U.S.C. § 1396n(c)(6), (c)(10)
(c)(iO) (2006).
65. The predecessor
predecessor agency
agency toto the United
United States Department
Department of
of Health and
and Human Services.
Services.
66. 42 U.S.C. § 1302(a)
1302(a) (2006).
(2006).
Id. (emphasis added).
67. [d.
68. Gonzales,
Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 259 (citing
(citing Household Credit Serv., Inc. v. Pfenning,
Pfenning, 541 U.S.
U.S. 232, 238
(2004)).
(2004».
Id. at
69. !d.
at 258 (citing National
National Cable && Telecomm.
Telecomm. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet
Internet Serv., 545
545 U.S.
U.S. 967,
967,
980 (2005)).
980
(2005».
(2001) (discussing limits on
70. Cf Whitman v. Am. Trucking
Trucking Ass'n, 531
531 U.S.
U.S. 457,
457, 468,
468, 471
471 (2001)
on
Congress's power
power to
delegate to
agencies).
Congress's
to delegate
to agencies).
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regulation may still be determined
determined to be
authority. Failing that, the regulation
Chevron deference. An agency's
persuasive, even if not entitled to Chevron
agency's
interpretation
interpretation of a statute, reflected
reflected in a rule, may have such
such
persuasive
enforceable even without a
persuasive authority so as to be enforceable
delegation.771'
Whether regulation
regulation 42 C.F.R. § 441.303 was the result of an
of
implied delegated authority, or alternatively, in the absence of
delegated authority, is supported by a nonetheless
highly
persuasive
nonetheless
persuasive
agency rationale,
rationale, is a question best resolved by considering the
7 2 42 C.F.R.
"population limits."
agency's own reasoning
reasoning in adopting "population
limits.,,72
§ 441.303
441.303 was promulgated
promulgated on July 25, 1994 through a formal
73
comment and rule making procedure.73
These 1994 regulations
regulations made
changes to an earlier version of the regulation, issued on June 1,
74
1988.74
How did CMS explain
1988.
explain the basis for the population limits in
its regulations?
regulations? Unfortunately, the only references to the provision on
population caps are rather oblique. In response to one comment, CMS
explained its reason for limiting the number served in the waiver
explained
waiver to
those set out in the waiver application:

1915(c)(2)(D) of the Act requires that we assess the
Section 1915(c)(2)(D)
reasonableness
cost-neutrality of its
estimate of the cost-neutrality
reasonableness of a State's estimate
program. If a State anticipates substantive changes in its cost and
utilization estimates, we believe that the State should be required
amendments to explain the basis and extent of the
to submit amendments
recomputed cost-effectiveness
cost-effectiveness formula,
changes the State's recomputed
based on the revised cost and utilization, must substantiate
75
continued cost-neutrality.
cost-neutrality.75

71. EEOC v. Arabian Oil Co.,
U.S. 244, 257 (1991)
(1991) (citing Gen. Elec. v. Gilbert, 429 U.s.
U.S. 125,
125,
71.
Co., 499 U.s.
141-42
Heimmermann v. First Union Mortgage
th Cir.
Cir.
141-42 (1976));
(1976»; accord Heimmermann
Mortgage Corp.,
Corp., 305 F.3d 1257,
1257, 1261
1261 (11
(11th
2002).
72. Under the Administrative Procedure Act, agencies are required
required to provide a general statement of
of
a proposed regulation's
Semiconductor,
regulation's basis and purpose when promulgated.
promulgated. See Schiller v. Tower
Tower Semiconductor,
Ltd., 449 F.3d 286, 297-98 (2d Cir. 2006).
73. 59 Fed. Reg. 37,702
37,702 (Sept. 25,
25, 1994).
19,959 (June I,
1, 1988).
74. 53 Fed. Reg. 19,959
75. 59 Fed. Reg. 37,702,
37,702, 37,708
37,708 (Sept. 25, 1994).
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In another
another section, CMS also elaborated on its requirement that
states report the number of people
people to be served in the waiver
program:

of
Even though we have eliminated the "C"
"C" value (number of
unduplicated waiver individuals
individuals a State intends to serve for each
each
year of
the waiver) from the equation, we will continue to require
ofthe
each state to report this information
information to us as part of a waiver
waiver
request. This number may be revised when a State determines
determines
that it needs to increase
increase or decrease the number
of
individuals
it
number
estimates it would serve under the waiver. We will include this
76
number in our approval notices.76
What is especially
especially notable is the absence of any assertion by CMS
of a clear statutory basis for imposing population limits on waiver
programs. In promulgating
promulgating this regulation, CMS cited no statutory
"interpretive gap."
gap." It referenced no
provision. It pointed to no "interpretive
legislative history. It divined
no
evidence
of
Congressional intent.
divined
evidence
Congressional
This may be considered telling and convincing evidence that such
such
limits are not based on the statute. In the absence of a statutory basis
for the rule, its own authority to have set "population limits"
limits" is
questionable.
"[T]he
mere
promulgation
of
a
regulation,
without
a
questionable. "[T]he
promulgation
concomitant exegesis
exegesis of the statutory authority for doing so,
'power to persuade'
persuade' as to the existence
obviously lacks the 'power
existence of such
such
77
authority.
,,77
authority."
Moreover, CMS uses the term "cost and utilization estimates"
estimates" in
the first paragraph, and the term "estimates"
"estimates" is repeated
repeated in the second
paragraph. It does not use the terms population
"limits" or "caps."
"caps."
population "limits"
These estimates appear to be solely determined
determined by states. The only
limitations to the general waiver program expressed in the comments
comments
are in reference
"cost neutrality,"
reference to demonstrating "cost
neutrality," an issue that
Congress did reference
reference pervasively
pervasively in the statute. 78 It seems evident
76. 59 Fed. Reg. 37,702, 37,70~9
37,708-09 (Sept. 25,
1994).
25, 1994).
77. Pub. Citizen v. U.S. Dep't of Health &
& Human Servs., 332 F.3d 654, 661 n.9 (D.C. Cir. 2003)
2003)
(quoting
(quoting Adamo Wrecking Co. v. United States, 434 U.S. 275, 287 n.5 (1978)).
(1978».
78. 42 U.S.C. § 1396n(c)(2)(D),
1396n(c)(2)(D), (4)(A) (2006).
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"estimates" that the language
by the use of the term "estimates"
language in the regulation
was not designed to further a Congressional
Congressional intent to limit the waiver
population. Rather, these "population
"population limits"
limits" merely
merely appear
appear to have
been a means to demonstrate the waiver's cost-neutrality.
Further
Further support that the regulation's limiting language was
merely a procedure to demonstrate cost neutrality
intended to be merely
rather than to place
gleaned
place a limit on population growth may be gleaned
"Supportive
from the section heading of 42 C.F.R. § 441.303: "Supportive
Required." That the population limits were merely a
Documents Required."
requirement needed to demonstrate the program's "cost
procedural requirement
"cost
neutrality"
neutrality" is supported by other narrative provided
provided in the comments
comments
to the regulations. The 1985 comments to the predecessor regulation
42 C.F.R. §§ 441.303 similarly focused on "estimates"
"estimates" and
demonstrating
demonstrating cost neutrality:
. .. requires
Section 441.303(f)(4)
441.303(f)(4) ...
requires States to specify the number
deinstitutionalized
from certified
of waiver clients actually being de
institutionalized Jrom
admission ..... . . States must
facilities versus those diverted from admission.
also specify where the diverted
individuals
diverted individuals will be coming from
and how many will come from each location....
location.... These changes
are a result of our experience
experience dealing with waiver requests and
are needed to determine
determine whether
whether the State's estimates
estimates are
79
reasonable.79
In reviewing the regulatory
regulatory history of the waiver program, it is

worth considering
considering CMS's history of making overly restrictive
regulations. CMS itself recognized
preventing states
recognized this history of preventing
contravening
from taking full advantage of the waiver program and contravening
Congressional intent. The most vivid example of this is what was at
"cold bed test," in which CMS required
required
one time referred to as the "cold
states to demonstrate that they had actual empty institutional
institutional slots or
"beds" to match each waiver slot the state sought to provide:
"beds"

79. 50 Fed. Reg. 10,013,
10,013, 10,018
10,018 (Mar. 13, 1985).
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believe that the requirement
requirement that States establish
establish that there
We believe
would be sufficient
sufficient institutional
institutional bed capacity
capacity for their waiver
waiver
that there was no waiver
waiver should
should be
population in the event that
rescinded. While this requirement
requirement served a sound analytical
cost-neutrality test in the early days of
of the
purpose as part of the cost-neutrality
purpose
experience over the last several
several years has shown
shown it
program, our experience
requirement placed
placed an
to be of diminishing value. The requirement
unreasonable burden
burden on States by requiring
requiring them
them to project
project the
unreasonable
institutional capacity. That
That
estimated development
development of additional institutional
additional burden was never the requirement's
requirement's intent and its
development
interests of the States and the
development was contrary to the interests
Federal Government. 8800

respite services,
services, a type of service
service
CMS also put a limitation on respite
provided in waiver programs,
programs, without statutory
statutory authority81 for such
1990 legislation.
which Congress
Congress then eliminated
eliminated in
in 1990
legislation. 81
limits, which
1994 promulgation
In
In summary, the 1994
promulgation of the home and communitycommunitybased waiver program regulation, while consistent
consistent with CMS's
CMS's
evidence a
history of overly-restrictive
overly-restrictive waiver provisions, does not evidence
intended states to have federally-imposed
belief that Congress
Congress intended
population caps in their standard waiver programs.
programs. Rather, it appears
that the regulations demonstrate CMS's focus on cost neutrality, or
or
thereof, as its purpose in adopting the regulation,
the demonstration thereof,
an issue for which there is abundant evidence
evidence of Congressional
Congressional
intent.
"caps" did not come from the 1994 language, did they come
If the "caps"
from the prior language?
language? The 1985 regulation sets out a lengthy and
complex formula for data that states must provide CMS in their
82 However, the regulation makes no reference to
waiver application. 82
83 Rather than
"caps" or
population limitations.
"limits" or "caps,"
"caps," the
"limits"
"caps"
or population
limitations. 83 Rather

80. 59 Fed. Reg. 37,702, 37,712 (Sept. 25, 1994).
81.
Id.at 37,704.
81. Id.
Appendix I to this
82. The actual regulation
regulation as it existed prior to the 1994 change is included in Appendix
article.
13, 1985).
(Mar. 13,
10,026-27 (Mar.
83. 50 Fed. Reg. 10,026-27
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term
tenn used in the
the regulation
regulation is "estimates."
"estimates." This
This term
tenn is
is used
used explicitly
explicitly
84
84
effectiveness.
cost
to
in
in reference
reference to cost effectiveness.
When one reviews
reviews CMS's regulatory
regulatory history for a rationale
rationale
authorizing strict limits on the number of participants
authorizing
participants for the
"thoroughness evident in its consideration,
"thoroughness
consideration, the validity of
of its
reasoning,
reasoning, its consistency
consistency with
with earlier and
and later pronouncements,
pronouncements, and
"85 one finds
all those
those factors which give it power to persuade
persuade .. .. . ,,85
very little evidence
evidence to support
support such limitations. It is evident
evident from the
neutrality that
above regulatory
regulatory history that it was the test of cost neutrality
86
In
CMS was
concerned about, not population
was most concerned
population limits per
per se.
se.86
In
contrast to a provision of specific limits of participants
participants in the waiver
program,
Congressional intent to limit waiver
program, the evidence
evidence of Congressional
programs on the basis of cost-neutrality
cost-neutrality is explicit in the language
language of
of
CMS's
the legislation,
legislation, and manifested
manifested in its legislative
legislative history
history and CMS's
regulatory history. 87
87
regulatory
Thus, the Makin court's view that the regulations evidenced
evidenced a
statutory
statutory intent for the waiver program
program to have fixed limits, and that
"reasonable promptness"
exception to the "reasonable
such limits carved
carved out an exception
promptness"
provision, is not a position supported by CMS in its regulatory
history. In the waiver's regulatory history, CMS makes no pretense
pretense to
intent
to
establish
mandatory
limitations
speak for Congressional
Congressional
limitations on
the waiver program (with the exception
exception of the model waiver
88
program).
program).88 Rather, the regulatory
regulatory history appears
appears to support
support a waiver
"estimates" of the number of beneficiaries,
program that sets forth "estimates"
beneficiaries, or
"soft" cap on the number of participants: amendable,
at best, a "soft"
amendable,
flexible, and limited only to the extent that they continue to meet the
"limits" cited in
cost-effectiveness standard set out by Congress. The "limits"
cost-effectiveness
C.F.R.
.R. §§ 441.303 were merely an easy
the simplified version of 42 C.F
and convenient way for CMS to have states demonstrate
demonstrate cost
neutrality. To the extent that the Makin court saw these limits as
1, 1988).
also 53 Fed. Reg. 19,959, 19,962 (June 1,
84. See also
& Co.,
Co., 323 U.S.
Arabian Oil
Oil Co., 499
244,257
(1991) (quoting Skidmore v. Swift &
85. EEOC v. Arabian
499 U.S. 244,
257 (1991)
140 (1944)).
(1944)).
134, 140
134,
supra notes 59 and 60.
86. See supra
No.97-208, at
at 481-82 (1981), reprinted
reprintedin 1981 U.S.C.C.A.N. 396, 747-48.
REP. No.
87. H. R. REp.
infra note 158.
88. See infra
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Congressionally authorized,
authorized, fixed
fixed and firm enough
enough implicitly
implicitly to
Congressionally
avoid the "reasonable
"reasonable promptness"
promptness" obligation, regulation
regulation 42 C.F.R.
441.303 does not appear
appear to have
have been drafted with the intention
intention to
§ 441.303
support such
such an interpretation.
support
FINDING A
SUPPORT IN
IN THE STATUTE
STATUTE FOR FINDING
A "REASONABLE
"REASONABLE
III. SUPPORT

PROMPTNESS"
PROMPTNESS" OBLIGATION
OBLIGATION

"ReasonablePromptness"
A.
A. Statutory Support
Supportfor Inclusion ofthe "Reasonable
Requirement
If regulation 42 C.F.R. § 441.303 cited
cited by Makin, Braddock,
Braddock,
evidence a Congressional
Congressional
Bryson and subsequent courts does not evidence
intent
intent to impose numerical
numerical limitations
limitations on state waiver
waiver programs,
programs, how
statute address the question
question of whether the "reasonable
"reasonable
does the statute
promptness"
promptness" provision applies to waiver
waiver programs?
programs? The most
compelling interpretation
interpretation is also the most obvious interpretation. The
compelling
"cardinal
construction"--giving effect to the plain
of statutory
statutory construction"-giving
"cardinal rule
rule of
meaning of a statute-supports
statute-supports this inclusion:
[A] court should always turn first to one, cardinal
cardinal canon before
all others. We have stated time and time again that courts must
presume
presume that a legislature says in a statute what it means and
there ....
means in a statute what it says there.
. . . When the words of a
statute are unambiguous, then this first canon is also the last:
complete." 89
is complete.,,89
"judicial inquiry is
Although the Medicaid statute is notoriously complicated, stripped
away, the plain language of the statute does not exempt the waiver
from the "reasonable
"reasonable promptness"
promptness" provision. Specifically, 42 U.S.C.
community-based services as
1396n(c)(1) includes home and community-based
§ 1396n(c)(I)
1396a(8)
assistance." 9° 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396a(8)
within the definition of "medical assistance.,,90
91
promptness."
reasonable
with
provided
be
assistance
"such
requires "such
be provided with reasonable promptness.',91
89.
90.
91.

(1992) (citations omitted).
Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253-54 (1992)
Conn. Nat'l Bank v. Gennain,
1396n(c)(1) (2006).
42 U.S.C. § 1396n(c)(I)
Id. §§ 1396a(8).
1396a(8).
[d.
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The apparent
apparent presumption
presumption in
in Makin and
and other
other courts
courts that
that
The
Congress's failure
failure to
to waive
waive the
the "reasonable
"reasonable promptness"
promptness" was
was an
Congress's
oversight is not supported
supported from a review
review of
of the
the statute's
statute's context
context and
and
oversight
that
legislative history.
history. The
The language
language in the
the statute
statute demonstrates
demonstrates
legislative
Congress was not unfamiliar
unfamiliar with
with the
the requirements
requirements of
of the Medicaid
Medicaid
Congress
statute
statute and
and was
was specific
specific about
about which
which provisions
provisions of the
the Act
Act that
that it
wanted waived. As set forth
forth below,
below, the "reasonable
"reasonable promptness"
promptness"
wanted
these:
among
included
provision
provision was
was not included

A
A waiver
waiver granted
granted under
under this
this subsection
subsection may include
include a waiver
waiver of
of
the requirements
requirements of section 1396a(a)(1)
1396a(a)(l) of this title (relating
(relating to
statewideness), section 1396a(10)(B)
1396a(1O)(B) of this title (relating to
statewideness),
comparability),
comparability), and section
section 1396a(10)(C)(i)(1)(II)
1396a(1O)(C)(i)(1)(III) of this title
(relating
(relating to income and resource
resource rules applicable
applicable in
in the
92

community. 92
community.

unius
Under the maxim of statutory
statutory construction, expression
expression un
ius est
Under
"reasonable
exclusion alterius,
Congress's exclusion of the "reasonable
alterius, Congress's
promptness"
promptness" provision from the list of statutory
statutory requirements
requirements that it
authorized a state to waive in its waiver program should be viewed as
authorized
93
Further supporting
an intention that it not be waived. 93
supporting the
proposition that the statute's plain language
language was deliberate
deliberate and
of
reflective of Congressional intent is the fact that the waiver of one of
the provisions listed above, the exclusion of income and resource
provisions, was not in the original 1981 language of the waiver
waiver
94 By
exemption
program. It was added in 1986. 94
failing to also add an exemption
"reasonable promptness" when Congress added the income and
for "reasonable
resource exemption, a presumption arises that Congress did not view
the failure to exempt reasonable promptness requirements in 1981 to
"oversight." When Congress amends a section of the statute but
be an "oversight."
Id.§§ 1396n(
1396n(c)(3).
92. Id.
c )(3).
23 (\983)
(1983) ("Where
("Where Congress includes particular
16, 23
Cf Russelo v. United States, 446 U.S. \6,
93. Cj
that
generally presumed that
Act, it isis generally
an .another
-another section of the same Act,
omits it an
language in
in one section but omits
language
United
exclusion." (quoting United
inclusion and exclusion."
the disparate inclusion
acts intentionally and purposely in the
Congress acts
Congress
Cir. 1972»).
1972))).
Bo, 472
472 F.2d 720, 722 (5th Cir.
States v.
v. Wong
Wong Kim Bo,
States
Stat. \874
1874
941 \1(c),
100 Stat.
No. 99-509,
99-509, §§ 94\
Act of
of \986,
1986, Pub. L. No.
Budget Reconciliation
Reconciliation Act
94. Omnibus
Omnibus Budget
94.
(c), \00
(1986).
(\986).
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leaves
leaves other language
language unchanged,
unchanged, it 95suggests
suggests that the original
original
intent.
true
its
of
reflective
was
language
reflective
of
its
true
intent.
95
language
In
In the
the face of such relatively
relatively clear
clear provisions
provisions in the
the statute, there
there is
burden that must be overcome
overcome to demonstrate
demonstrate that Congress
Congress
a heavy burden
did not in fact mean
mean the words it used in the statute
statute it enacted.
and
will
not be presumed
not
favored'
'''[R]epeals
implication are
are not favored'
presumed
"'[R]epeals by implication
legislature to repeal
repeal [is]
[is] clear and
the 'intention
'intention of the legislature
unless the
96 When other
manifest.
other provisions
provisions of the statute
statute are
are considered,
manifest.'",96
particularly with respect to how the program is intended
intended to operate,
operate,
particularly
envisioned
that
Congress
for
finding
there is additional support
support
that Congress envisioned the
reasonable promptness
promptness provision
provision to apply to the waiver program.
Promptness
for the Inclusion
Inclusion of the Reasonable
Reasonable Promptness
B. Support
Supportfor
Waiver Statute
Requirements Set Forth
Other Requirements
Obligation
Statute
Obligation from Other
Forth in the Waiver
Looking
Looking beyond
beyond the explicit
explicit inclusion
inclusion of the "reasonable
"reasonable
other
promptness"
promptness" obligation
obligation in the language of the statute, other
inclusion.
"It
contextual support
provisions provide
provide additional contextual
support for its
"It
construction that the words of a
'fundamental canon of statutory construction
is a 'fundamental
statute
statute must be read in their context and with a view to their place in
' 97 In particular, the waiver statute
the overall statutory scheme.
scheme.'",97
of
expansive notice provisions to inform large numbers of
contains expansive
contains
potential beneficiaries
beneficiaries of the program, and the program's provision
potential
non-institutional
beneficiaries with alternatives
for providing beneficiaries
alternatives to non-institutional
placement
placement suggest that Congress did not have an intent for fixed and
excluding the
inflexible population
population limits. On the other hand, excluding
reasonable promptness provision provokes substantial conflict
conflict with
intended.
suggesting that this was never intended
these provisions, suggesting
As suggested in the portion of the statute reproduced
reproduced below, it is
apparent that Congress wanted notice of the waiver program to reach
the broadest range of potential recipients. The statute sets forth as a
condition of approval to operate a waiver program that notice to
1400, 1406 (D.C.
(D.C. Cir. 1992).
Eidmann v. MSPB, 976 F.2d 1400,
95. See Eidmann
(citations
662 (2007)
96. Nat'l Assoc. of Homebuilders
Homebuilders v. Defenders
Defenders of Wildlife, 551 U.S. 644, 662
(2007) (citations
omitted).
120, 133 (2000) (citing Davis v. Mich.
Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120,
& Williamson Tobacco
v. Brown
Brown &
97. FDA v.
(1989)).
of Treasury, 489 U.S. 803, 809 (1989».
Dep't ofTreasury,
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potential beneficiaries
beneficiaries be provided,
provided, and for their
their choice
choice of
of
potential
98
is
often
provision
This
community
services
be
effectuated.
This
provision
is
to
be
effectuated.
community services
referred
referred to as the "freedom
"freedom of choice"
choice" provision:
A
under this subsection
subsection unless the
A waiver
waiver shall not be granted under
the
Secretary
provides
assurances
satisfactory
to
State
State provides assurances satisfactory
Secretary that - (C)
(C)
such individuals
individuals who are determined
determined to be
be likely to require the
level of
of care provided
provided in a hospital,
hospital, nursing facility, or
intermediate
intermediate care facility for the mentally
mentally retarded are informed
informed
of the feasible alternatives,
alternatives, if available under the waiver, at the
choice of such individuals, to the provision
provision of inpatient hospital
services,
services, nursing facility services,
services, or services in an intermediate
99
.... 99
care facility for the mentally retarded ....
This "freedom
"freedom of choice"
choice" provision was raised by the Plaintiffs in
Makin as a separate
separate legal basis to challenge
challenge the state's
state's waiting
waiting list.
The Plaintiffs
Plaintiffs argued
argued that by maintaining
maintaining an indefinite
indefinite wait list, the
state's waiver program
program was denying
denying beneficiaries
beneficiaries their choice as
above.' 00 The Makin
Makin court
statutory language
cited
provided in the statutory
language
above.100
rejected this claim, but its analysis of the issue may be criticized
criticized for
borrowing heavily
heavily from its earlier legal conclusion:
Though this requires the State to give the Plaintiffs a choice from
services, it only requires it to allow a choice from
among the services,
"available" services. Unfortunately, when the spaces
among the "available"
"available"
are filled in the HCBS-MR
HCBS-MR program, it is no longer "available"
under the waiver. This remains the case regardless of whether
there is a wait list for the services. Since no regulation or other
limits"
"population limits"
law provides a different
different result regarding the "population
claiming
of the HCBS-MR programs and the Plaintiffs are not claiming
that they have no other alternatives under the waiver program,

98. See infra
infra note liS.
115.
98.
99.
99. 42 U.s.C.
U.S.C. § 1396n(c)(2)(C)
1396n(cX2)(C) (2006).
2d 1017,
1017, 1032
1032 (D. Haw. 1999).
F. Supp. 2d
100. Makin v. Hawaii, 114 F.
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the Plaintiffs
Plaintiffs have no
no valid "freedom
"freedom of choice"
choice" cause
cause of action
action
IOI
01
Medicaid statute
statute in
in this case.'
case.
under the Medicaid
Thus, in the court's
court's view the "freedom
"freedom of choice"
choice" provision,
provision, as
as
provision, is subject to slots
slots being
being "available":
"available":
well as the notice provision,
services
of
community-based
Medicaid
only
Medicaid beneficiaries
beneficiaries are notified
notified community-based services only
0 2 This interpretation
interpretation
the slots are "available"
"available" under
under the waiver. 1102
when the
appears to presume
presume aa Congressional
Congressional intent that beneficiaries
beneficiaries should
should
appears
the program only
only when
when there are
notified of their rights under the
be notified
to
them.
An
alternative
tangible
alternative reading
reading
tangible alternatives
alternatives readily
readily available
available
provision is that it is designed
designed for the state
state to develop
develop its
of the provision
of
community-based resources
resources to bring about beneficiaries'
beneficiaries' choice of
community-based
community based
based resources. Consumers
Consumers are advised of the services
community
that are provided (generally
(generally available)
available) under
under the waiver, whether
whether or
immediately accessible.
not immediately
"open slots available,"
Reading
"available" to mean "open
Reading "available"
available," however,
appears to ignore the word "feasible"
obligation to
"feasible" in the state's obligation
appears
103 "[IUt
under
the
waiver.
alternatives"
of
"feasible
inform
individuals
"feasible alternatives"
waiver.103
"[I]t
inform
'all words and provisions of statutes are intended to
is axiomatic
axiomatic that 'all
should
have meaning and are to be given effect, and no construction should
be adopted
adopted which would render statutory
statutory words or phrases
phrases
4
0
redundant or superfluous."'
superfluous."I04 "Feasible"
generally
"Feasible" generally
meaningless, redundant
05
successfully done or accomplished."'
accomplished.,,105
The
means "capable
"capable of being successfully
Makin court's interpretation
Makin
interpretation appears to render this word as
surplusage. The court's interpretation
interpretation appears to equate the word
"alternatives"
to
"available
slots" in
"alternatives" to "available slots"
in the waiver
waiver program. But
Congress's use of the word "feasible" in the statutory language,
"feasible alternatives,"
alternatives," suggests that Congress intended to advise and
"feasible
101.
101.

Id.
Id.
Id.
102. Id.
103. 42 u.s.C.
U.S.C. § 1396n(c)(2)(C) (2006).
103.
(2006).
v. Caraballo,
Caraballo, 200
104. United
United States
States v.
104.
200 F.3d 20, 25 (1st
(1st Cir. 1999); see also United States v. Menasche,
538-39 (1955).
(1955).
348 U.S.
348
U.S. 528,
528, 538-39
Donovan,
Textile Mfr.
Mfr. Inst.,
Inst., Inc.
Inc. v.
v. Donovan,
ed. 1957);
1957); accord
accord Am. Textile
739 (4th
(4th ed.
DICTIONARY 739
105. BLACK'S LAW DICfIONARY
105.
"feasible" referred to the technical capability
use of the term
(1981) (noting the statute's use
452 U.S. 490 (1981)
tenn "feasible"
dust remediation
remediation
in its
its issuance
issuance of
of its
its cotton
cotton dust
economic considerations
considerations in
OSHA from
from adding
adding economic
and precluded
precluded OSHA
rule).
rule).
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enable
enable consumers
consumers to choose
choose services
services technically
technically possible to be
provided them under
under the waiver, even
even if not
not presently
presently "available."
"available."
provided
This language
waiver
language suggests that as long as the services in the waiver
represent
represent "feasible
"feasible alternatives"
alternatives" to institutionalization,
institutionalization, Congress
Congress
wanted consumers
alternative services,
services, and
and to be
consumers aware of these 6alternative
0
them.1
receiving
of
choice
the
given
given
choice of receiving them. 106
The statute's
statute's broad
broad notice
notice provision appears
appears to conflict with the
The
availability of
of
court's construction
permitting states to restrict the availability
construction permitting
court's
Because the
the "freedom
"freedom of choice"
choice" provision is triggered
triggered when
when
slots. Because
1
07
care,107 not when he or she
someone is "likely" to meet the level of care,
someone
meets the level of care,
care, it applies
applies even
even before
before individuals
individuals definitively
definitively
qualify
qualify for waiver
waiver services.
services. Such
Such a broad notice requirement
requirement appears
. inconsistent with a construction that limits notice only when there are
"available" slots.
the goal
to advise
beneficiaries of only real,
If the
goal is
is to
advise beneficiaries
"available"
slots. If
interpretation seems
tangible,
"available slots"
tangible, "available
slots" as the Makin court's interpretation
108
language would have been better served by
to favor,10S
favor, the statutory language
definitively
alternatives only after they definitively
advising consumers of alternatives
"feasible alternatives"
alternatives" means
qualified
qualified for services. In contrast, if "feasible
services generally able to be provided under the waiver, notifying
beneficiaries early, even before
beneficiaries
before they definitively qualify, would
apprise the state of the need to meet the projected growth in the
program.
One can appreciate
appreciate why the court would want to find the statute's
statute's
reference
reference to "alternatives"
"alternatives" to mean
mean "available
"available slots."
slots." At first blush,
this interpretation
interpretation appears
underlying
appears to permit the court to escape an underlying
tension created
created after it determined that the waiver program is not
"available under
bound to the reasonable
reasonable promptness obligation. If "available
the state's
state's
available"
under
the
waiver,
the waiver" means "generally
"generally available"
compliance with the notice requirement would require it, confusingly,
to inform potential beneficiaries
beneficiaries of services under the waiver and
their "right" to choice. However, in light of its earlier holding
authorizing strict limits on the program, this would be appear to be a

1396n(c)(3) (2006).
106. 42 U.S.C. § 1396n(c)(3)
107. [d.
Id. § 1396n(c)(2)(C)
1396n(c)(2)(C) (emphasis
(emphasis added).
107.
1999).
114 F. Supp.
Supp. 2d 1017,1032
1017, 1032 (D.
(D. Haw. 1999).
108. Makin v.
v. Hawaii,
Hawaii, 114
lOS.
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senseless act,
act, because
because the
the state
state would
would not actually
actually have
have to provide
provide the
the
senseless
under
"available
services or
or effectuate
effectuate their
their choice.
choice. By finding that
that "available under
services
waiver" means "open
"open slots,"
slots," the
the court
court appears
appears initially
initially to have
have
the waiver"
avoided this exercise
exercise in
in futility.
futility. However,
However, rather
rather than
than resolve
resolve this
this
avoided
problem, this
this interpretation
interpretation really
really only
only heightens
heightens it.
it.
problem,
populations
have
Because most
most waiver
waiver programs
programs have populations in the
the thousands,
thousands,
Because
there will inevitably
inevitably be at least a few "available"
"available" slots under the
there
as beneficiaries
beneficiaries die, become
become too ill to stay
stay on the waiver,
waiver, or
or
waiver, as
other reasons,
reasons, become
become ineligible
ineligible or
or unable to
host of other
will, for a host
appears
a
program
even
when
benefit from the
the program. Thus,
Thus, even
program appears to be
be
benefit
°9
few
a
be
still be a few "available"
"available" slots.,
slots. 109
generally full, there
there essentially
essentially will
will still
generally
under the court's reading
reading limiting the notice requirement
requirement
Thus, even under
everyone
"open slots,"
slots," the presence
presence of a few slots still means that everyone
to "open
They
to
get
notice.
still
have
services
will
for
the
to
qualify
"likely"
"likely"
services
They
will have to get the notice even though, without
without the reasonable
reasonable
promptness obligation,
obligation, only a minute fraction may actually be able to
access the services,
services, and the state
state will not have any obligation to serve
access
the other applicants.
This, in turn, leads to another
another equally daunting problem: how are
"available" to be allocated? Are they to be provided
provided on
on
the few slots "available"
"first come first served" basis; or based on urgency of medical
a "first
combination of these? There is no
need; cost or cost savings; or some combination
prioritization, and
provision in the statute resolving this question of prioritization,
and
llo
110
Makin court did not address this issue. The presence of such
the Makin
complications should be an additional basis to view the
vexing complications
"Congress...
interpretation as disfavored. "Congress
court's interpretation
... does not alter the
fundamental details of a regulatory scheme in vague terms or
elephants in
ancillary provisions-it does not, one might say, hide elephants
mouseholes.,,111
mouseholes."l 1

in two instances that there were "a few remaining
decision the court itself noted in
109. In
In the
the Makin
Makin decision
109.
Id. at 1031
issue of
of material
material fact. !d.
unresolved issue
as an
an outstanding
outstanding unresolved
unfilled
left this
this issue
issue as
available" but
but left
unfilled slots
slots available"
F.
Lewis v. N.M. Dep't of Health, 275 F.
cited in
in other cases such as Lewis
problem has
has been
been cited
n.6. The
The same
same problem
n.6.
2003).
1319, 1334-35
1334-35 (D.N.M.
(D.N.M. 2003).
Supp. 2d
2d 1319,
Supp.
114F.Supp.2datO31n.6.
110.
110. Makin,
Makin, 114
F. Supp. 2d at 1031 n.6.
468 (2001)(citations
(2001) (citations omitted).
Trucking Ass'n, 531 U.S. 457, 468
Whitman v.
v. Am.
Am. Trucking
11l. Whitman
111.
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These complications
complications arise from the court's
court's interpretation
interpretation excluding
excluding
the reasonable
promptness
language
in
the
statute,
and
are
reasonable promptness language
and are all
all easily
easily
avoided
avoided with its inclusion. The broad notice of potential
potential beneficiaries
beneficiaries
does not become
become a wasteful
wasteful exercise
exercise in futility for the large number
number
of individuals
individuals unable
effectuated by a state
unable to have their choice effectuated
unwilling
unwilling to expand its program. Rather, it informs
informs the state of
of the
projected
projected needs for the program, and
and obligates
obligates the state to adjust
adjust its
ratio of institutional versus community
community services
services in its Medicaid
Medicaid
program to fit beneficiaries'
of
beneficiaries' desires. The substantial problem of
having to find practical
practical and legally
legally supported
supported methods
methods to ration
ration the
services
does
not
arise
when
the
statute's
plain
language
services
arise
plain language is given
given
effect
effect
In
In the regulatory history of the waiver, CMS's
eMS's interpretation
interpretation of the
while not directly addressing these
"freedom of choice"
"freedom
choice" provision, while
points, arguably provides
provides some inconsistencies
inconsistencies with the Makin
court's
"freedom of choice"
choice" provision to
court's interpretation
interpretation subjecting
subjecting the "freedom
"available
slots."
The
"available slots." The agency
agency explained:
Beneficiaries determined likely to require an SNF or ICF level of
of
care must be informed of the feasible alternatives
alternatives and given a
choice as to which type of services to receive . . . . The
determination of which long-term
long-term care options are feasible in a
determination
individual's needs, as
particular case should be based on the individual's
determined by an evaluation. As with other services
determined
services under
beneficiary who is not given the choice of home or
Medicaid, a beneficiary
or
alternative to SNF or ICF
ICF
community-based services
community-based
services as an alternative
services may request a fair hearing under 42 C.F.R. Part 431,
431,
Subpart E, unless the reason for the denial is that the group of
of
of
which the individual is a part is not included within the scope of
431.220(b)). Since a finding that home
the waiver (see 42 C.F.R. 431.220(b».
or community-based
community-based services are not feasible in a particular case
constitutes
Medicaid
constitutes denial of services covered under the State's Medicaid
1902(a)(3)) requires that
plan, the Medicaid statute (section 1902(a)(3»
applicants
beneficiaries be provided the procedural
applicants and beneficiaries
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protections of the Medicaid
Medicaid administrative
administrative hearing
hearing process
process as
as
protections
2
E."
Subpart
431,
described in
in 42
42 CFR
CFR part
part 431, Subpart E.112
described

This language
language tends
tends to support
support application
application of the reasonable
reasonable
broad
reflects
the
broad notice
notice and
and
requirement to the waiver. It reflects
promptness requirement
home and
and
hearing requirement
requirement for anyone
anyone denied his or her choice
choice of home
hearing
community-based services,
services, exempting
exempting only
only those seeking services
community-based
program. Il 133 Second, the
the basis of
of
included in the scope
scope of waiver program."
not included
denial of service
service embraced
embraced in this explanation
explanation focuses not on
on
denial
"feasible in a particular
resources, but whether or not services
services are "feasible
particular
resources,
1 4 The emphasis
case.,,114
determinations, without
without
on individual determinations,
case."
reference to "quotas,"
"resource limitations,"
limitations," suggests that
"caps," or "resource
"quotas," "caps,"
reference
115
denying individual
these are not proper justifications
justifications for denying
individual choice.
choice. I IS
however, is that it does not reference as a basis for
Most compelling, however,
notice or a hearing
hearing when slots are not "available."
"available." And
the denial of notice
since this would be, by far, the largest
largest and most obvious
obvious basis for
CMS
services-if
potential
beneficiaries
to
be
denied
services-if
eMS
believed this to
potential beneficiaries
denial-this omission
omission should be
be a legitimate reason for such denial-this
of
viewed as a telling contradiction
contradiction to the theory that the statute's use of
viewed
"feasible alternatives available under the waiver" is
the language "feasible
meant to equate with "open slots."
C. Applying the Reasonable
Reasonable Promptness
Provides
ObligationProvides
Promptness Obligation
C.
Legislation and
Consistency
Anti-DiscriminationLegislation
Congress's Anti-Discrimination
Consistency with Congress's
Policies
Policies Promoting
Promoting Deinstitutionalization
Deinstitutionalization

"IntegrationMandate" and
Tension Between the ADA
1. The Tension
1.
ADA's's "Integration
Makin
"reasonable promptness" language in waiver
Giving effect to the "reasonable
programs would require a restructuring of state Medicaid programs,
1,1981).
1981).
48,535-36 (Oct.
(Oct. I,
112. 46 Fed. Reg.
Reg. 48,532,
48,532, 48,535-36
113.
113. [d.
Id.
Id.
114. /d.
492 F.3d
F.3d 1094,
1094, 1107 (9th Cir. 2007) (sustaining District
Ball v.
v. Rodgers,
Rodgers, 492
115.
liS. Cf Ball
District Court's grant of
of an
an

the right
be
rights-(a) the
"individuals have two explicitly identified rights-{a)
injunction and holding that "individuals
injunction
right toto be
among
right to
to choose
choose among
and (b) the
the right
infonned
care, and
long-term institutional
institutional care,
to traditional,
traditional, long-tenn
of alternatives
alternatives to
informed of
Ky. 2005).
v. Holsinger,
Holsinger, 356
356 F. Supp. 2d 763, 769 (E.D. Ky.
Michele P. v.
those alternatives");
alternatives"); Michele
those
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services expand
expand to meet
meet assessed
assessed need. Would
Would such
such an
an expansion
expansion
as services
is
an
expansion
Such
on
states?
be
an
unwarranted
additional
burden
on
states?
Such
expansion
burden
additional
unwarranted
be
consistent with long-standing
statutory precedents.
precedents. It has been
been
long-standing statutory
in fact consistent
the reasoning
reasoning and the holding of Makin that has conflicted
conflicted with these
these
statutes.
statutes.
reasonable
The Makin court's
court's interpretation
interpretation avoiding
avoiding the reasonable
promptness
promptness provision
provision causes a basic conflict
conflict with the ADA's
ADA's
"integration
"integration mandate,"
mandate," which the court
court itself appears
appears to have
116
l
6
generally requires states and other
acknowledged."
The ADA
acknowledged.
ADA generally
other
"reasonable accommodations"
governmental
governmental entities to make "reasonable
accommodations" to their
their
decided
programs to make them accessible
accessible to the disabled. Olmstead,
Olmstead, decided
institutionalizing individuals unnecessarily,
unnecessarily,
under the ADA, held that institutionalizing
i.e., withholding
withholding home or community-based
community-based medical
medical treatment that is
segregation
safe and appropriate
appropriate to the individual,
individual, is a form of segregation
prohibited
integration mandate."
mandate. 1177 At the same
same time,
prohibited by the ADA's integration
opinion recognized
Justice Ginsburg's plurality
plurality OpInIOn
recognized that cost
cost
considerations might make immediate deinstitutionalization
considerations
deinstitutionalization too
costly to be considered
considered a "reasonable
modification." "Sensibly
"Sensibly
"reasonable modification."
fundamental-alteration component
component of the reasonableconstrued, the fundamental-alteration
reasonablemodifications regulation would allow the State to show that, in the
modifications
Plaintiffs
allocation of available
available resources, immediate relief for the Plaintiffs
would be inequitable,
inequitable, given the responsibility
responsibility the State has
undertaken for the care and treatment of a large and diverse
' 1 8 The Court held that
population of persons with mental disabilities."
disabilities.,,118
a state could meet the integration mandate of the ADA without
effectively working
immediate
"comprehensive, effectively
immediate relief by having a "comprehensive,
19
services."I 19
plan" to provide services.
promptness" requirement
When Medicaid's
Medicaid's "reasonable
"reasonable promptness"
requirement is
interpreted
interpreted to be not applicable to waiver programs, substantial
questions arise about Medicaid program's compliance with the

116. Makin v. Hawaii, 114 F. Supp. 2d 1017, 1033-35 (D. Haw. 1999).
(S.D. Fla. 1999) (finding the use of Medicaid
117. Cramer v. Chiles, 33 F. Supp. 2d 1342, 1353-54 (S.D.
funds to continue
continue to provide services in institutions and nursing homes without permitting Medicaid
funded community placement violates the ADA).
(1999).
U.S. 581,
581,604
118. Olmstead v. L.C., 527 U.S.
604 (1999).
119. Jd.
Id.
605-06.
119.
at 605-06.
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integration mandate.
mandate. Allowing
Allowing states
states to set "population
"population
ADA's integration
limits"
limits" in their waiver programs
programs that are below
below their real
real need leaves
leaves
individuals in institutions
institutions unable
unable to move to non-restrictive
non-restrictive
individuals
receive
environments in the community. Other
Other individuals,
individuals, unable to receive
environments
to
become
community-based
services,
compelled
become
compelled
are
services,
community-based
institutionalized.
seen below, courts
courts that have
have found population
population
institutionalized. As seen
caps as authorized
authorized under
under Medicaid
Medicaid have struggled
struggled with this issue.
of
mandating increases
possibility
the
Makin considered
considered
possibility
increases in the
waiver program
program to comply
comply with the ADA's requirement
requirement that
programs make
make "reasonable
modification" to avoid discriminatory
discriminatory
"reasonable modification"
programs
120
20
determined it lacked material facts
effects.
effects.' Ultimately, the court determined
2 ' Although
sufficient to rule on the question on summary
summary judgment.'
judgment. 121
reached the question, the court in Braddock did.
Makin never reached
Initially, it acknowledged
acknowledged the tension
tension between
between the statutes, but left an
unsatisfactory
when it simply held that compliance
compliance with
unsatisfactory resolution when
the Medicaid statute
statute dispensed with the need to comply
comply with the
ADA:
Thus, to the extent that the statutes point in opposite directions,
Medicaid statute
one of them must prevail. In this case, the Medicaid
"[w]here
should receive the laurel wreath because, "[
w]here there is no
clear
clear intention otherwise, a specific statute
statute will not be controlled
controlled
enactment"[;]
. ...
. . by a general one, regardless of the priority
priority of enactment"[;]
that a
construction
tenet
of
statutory
well
established
... "[i]t
"[i]t is a
...
established
statute." If Arc [the
specific statute controls over a general statute."
Plaintiffs]
Plaintiffs] were correct, the general
general ADA injunction against
Medicaid provisions for
discrimination would repeal the specific Medicaid
discrimination
cannot
be. In so stating, we do
programs.
That
the limited waiver
not mean that the ADA has nothing whatsoever to say about a
community-based services to the
state's obligation to provide community-based

Supp. 2d at 1033-35.
1033-35.
120. Makin,
Makin, 114
114 F. supp.
120.
Id. at 1035.
1035.
121. Id.
121.
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....We merely
disabled ....
merely state that the ADA does not overcome
22
Medicaid statute.
the Medicaid
the specific cap provision in
in the
statute. 122

Braddock opinion was withdrawn after a rehearing was
The initial Braddock
123
123
granted. In the second Braddock
Braddock opinion, the court simply found
granted.
that even though the state had a population cap on its waiver
waiver
program, it nonetheless
"comprehensive, effectively working
nonetheless had a "comprehensive,
plan,"
plan," the defense
defense that Justice Ginsburg's opinion offered in
124
124
Olmstead.
The Braddock
Braddock court looked to the growth of the
Olmstead.
program
over
the
years
to find a "comprehensive,
"comprehensive, effectively
effectively working
program
12 5
plan.,,125
plan."
Washington's HCBS program is substantial in size, providing
integrated care to nearly 10,000
10,000 Medicaid-eligible
Medicaid-eligible disabled
integrated
disabled
....The waiver program
program is full, and there is
persons in the state ....
participants when slots open up.
a waiting list that admits new participants
. .
. .[A]ll
. [A]ll Medicaid-eligible
Medicaid-eligible disabled persons will have the
opportunity to participate
becomes
opportunity
participate in the program once space becomes
available, based solely on their mental-health
mental-health needs and position
available,
on the waiting list.
Washington's HCBS program increased at
Further, the size of Washington's
1983 to 7,597 slots in 1997
the state's request from 1,227 slots in 1983
to 9,977 slots beginning in 1998
....
The
annual state budget for
1998 ....
community-based
community-based disability programs
programs such as HCBS more than
doubled
$167 million in fiscal year 1994,
1994, to $350 million in
in
doubled from $167
fiscal year 2001,
2001, despite significant cutbacks or minimal budget
growth for many state agencies ....
....During the same period, the
budget for institutional programs remained
remained constant, while the
institutionalized
.... Today, the
institutionalized population
population declined
declined by 20% ....
statewide
institutionalized population is less than 1,000.
statewide institutionalized
The Department's
Department's Division of Developmental
Developmental Disabilities
(DDD) has also seen its biennial budget
$750
budget grow steadily
steadily from $750
122.
122.
123.
123.
124.
124.
125.
125.

Arc of Wash. State, Inc. v. Braddock,
F.3d 641,644
Braddock, 403
403 F.3d
641, 644 (9th Cir. 2005) (citations omitted).
Id.
[d. at 616.
Id.
621-22 (citing Olmstead,
605).
[d. at 621-22
Olmstead, 527
527 U.S.
U.S. at 605).
Id.
/d.
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million in 1995 to over $1
$1 billion in 1999, making
making it one of the
Family
fastest growing budgets
budgets within the Department .... .. ..Family
DDD clients living at
support services, given to families of DDD
home, have grown even faster, benefitting
benefitting from a 250% budget
budget
growth over five years .....
There is thus no indication
indication that the
. .. There
state
state is neglecting its responsibilities
responsibilities to the HCBS program
126
programs.
other
to
programs. 126
relative

The same holding was made in Sanchez v. Johnson,
Johnson, another Ninth
127
1
27
Circuit case decided
decided a few months before. Like the quoted section
section
Circuit
effective plan based on
comprehensive, effective
above, Sanchez also found a comprehensive,
substantial increases
increases in funding and case loads for community
28
placement. 128
placement.1
Although
Although these opinions cite indications
indications of past progress, they do
so vaguely without setting forth an objective level of progress
necessary
necessary for a state to be deemed to have a "comprehensive,
"comprehensive,
129
plan.,,129 The "plans"
effectively
Circuit
"plans" cited by the Ninth Circuit
effectively working plan."'
provide
contradicting the notion of a
provide little indicia of future progress, contradicting
"plan"
in
its
ordinary
sense.
The
Third
Circuit
FrederickL. v.
"plan" in its ordinary sense. The Third Circuit case, Frederick
Welfare, by contrast, rejected reliance
Department
Department of Public
Public Welfare,
reliance of past
past
as evidence
deinstitutionalization
progress
progress alone in deinstitutionalization
evidence of a
30
plan."'
working
effective,
"comprehensive,
"comprehensive, effective, working plan.,,130
communicated
[W]hat
[W]hat is needed at the very least is a plan that is communicated
in some manner. The District Court accepted the
Commonwealth's reliance
Commonwealth's
reliance on past progress without requiring a
by
it
to take all reasonable
commitment
commitment
reasonable steps to continue that
126. Id.
Id at 621
621 (citations omitted).
1051, 1067
1067 (9th
(9th Cir.
2005).
127. Sanchez
Sanchez v.
v. Johnson,
Johnson, 416
F.3d 1051,
127.
416 F.3d
Cir. 2005).
128. Id.
Id ("California's
("California's expenditures
expenditures for
for individuals
individuals in community
community settings increased 196% [between
the same
same period
period....
[Between 1996
caseload ...
...increased
increased fifty-five
fifty-five percent
1991 and
and 2001],
2001], while
while caseload
1991
percent inin the
.... [Between
1996
twenty percent.
reduced its
institution population
and
2000], California
and 2000],
California reduced
its institution
population by
by twenty
percent. DDS
DDS has also
also budgeted
budgeted 42
reduction in
Facilities and
and ten
new Intermediate
Intermediate Care
Care Facilities,
new
new Community Care Facilities
ten new
Facilities, and
and anticipates
anticipates aareduction
in
allow it
it to
to close
close at
at least
least one
Developmental Center by
institutionalization
institutionalization that
that would
would allow
one Developmental
by 2007.") (internal
quotation
quotation marks omitted).
omitted).
621.
Id.; Braddock,
Braddock, 427
129. Id;
427 F.3d atat 621.
remanded, No.
130. Frederick L. v. Dep't
Dep't of Pub.
Pub. Welfare,
Welfare, 364
364 F.3d 487,
487, 500 (3d Cir. 2004), remanded,
No. 022004), vacated,
2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17810 (E.D.
3721,
3721,2004
(E.D. Pa. Sept.
Sept. 1,
1,2004),
vacated, 422
422 F.3d 151
lSI (3d Cir.
Cir. 2005).
2005).
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circumstances presented here, our reading of
progress. Under the circumstances
of
131
3
Olmstead would require no less. '
While past progress as in Braddock
Braddock and future assurances as in
Frederick L. may be indicators
Frederick
indicators of a plan, they leave vague and
and
unanswered
unanswered the two most pertinent questions
questions necessary
necessary for a court to
determine
effectiveness of a state "plan": (1) the factual question
determine the effectiveness
of how long must individuals wait to receive needed community
based services; and (2)
(2) the legal question
of
whether this length of
question of whether
time is "reasonable."
"reasonable." A "plan"
"plan" that cannot provide at least a rough or
approximate
approximate timeframe
time frame that services
services will be provided to beneficiaries
that are eligible and dependent upon them is really only a "plan"
"plan" in
name. Without answers to these questions,
questions, the ADA's integration
integration
"mandate" and more like merely
mandate looks less like a "mandate"
merely an
aspiration.
"reasonable promptness"
promptness" provision is read into the
Of course, if the "reasonable
achieved
waiver program, the ADA's integration mandate is readily achieved
disabilities who depend on Medicaid and are
for many of those with disabilities
eligible for the waiver. When a state provides waiver services in
"reasonably prompt"
prompt" time
timeframes,
it seems
seems difficult to conceive
conceive how
"reasonably
frames, it
"reasonable modification"
also meet the "reasonable
the state would not also
requirement of the ADA's integration mandate. The symmetry of this
construction
Because applying the Medicaid's
Medicaid's
construction is itself compelling. Because
reasonable
promptness
provision
in
waivers
would
best
effectuate
effectuate the
reasonable
ADA's integration requirement, and avoidance
reasonable
avoidance of the reasonable
promptness language
language is likely to frustrate it, this interpretation,
interpretation,
flowing from the statute's
statute's plain language, should be the first and
most favored interpretation. "When
of
"When two statutes are capable of
coexistence,
expressed
coexistence, it is the duty of the courts, absent a clearly expressed
Congressional intention
Congressional
intention to the contrary, to regard each as
32
effective."'
The ADA is clearly a statute
effective.,,132
statute of broad
broad general
131.
Id.
131. [d.
132.
Radzanower v. Touche Ross &
& Co., 426 U.S. 148,
148, 155 (1976)
132. Radzanower
(1976) (quoting
(quoting Morton
Morton v. Mancari,
Mancari, 417
417
U.S. 535, 551 (1974));
(1974)); see also Powell
(1950) (holding that for
Powell v. U.S. Cartridge
Cartridge Co., 339 U.S. 497, 519 (1950)
two overlapping
overlapping statutes
statutes covering
covering the same subject matter, the interpretation
interpretation that satisfies both statutes
should be given effect, absent
absent a showing of impossibility); Schiller v. Tower Semiconductor, Ltd., 449
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congressional
"invoke the sweep of congressional
applicability. It is intended to "invoke
including the power to enforce
authority, including
enforce the fourteenth amendment
amendment
of
and to regulate commerce, in order to address the major areas of
33 It
discrimination faced day-to-day
day-to-day by people
people with disabilities.''
disabilities.,,133
It
seems clear that Congress
Congress intended to reach all elements
elements of society
and government
government activity in passing the ADA. Undoubtedly
Undoubtedly this
includes state Medicaid
Medicaid programs.
ReasonablePromptness
Promptness Obligation
Obligationin Waiver
2. Including
Including the Reasonable
Programs
Consistentwith Congress's
Congress 's Lengthy History
History
Programs Is Consistent
Promoting
Deinstitutionalization
Promoting Deinstitutionalization
Beyond these general principles of statutory construction,
construction, the
anti-discriminatory legislation suggests that
Congressional anti-discriminatory
history of Congressional
making waiver services available
available to those eligible with reasonable
reasonable
promptness best comports with Congressional
Congressional intent. The obligation
obligation
Medicaid programs to modify their programs to avoid
of Medicaid
discriminatory policies against the disabled did not merely
discriminatory
merely arise with
the ADA, but arises from earlier
earlier precedents. The ADA was
essentially an extension
extension of the Rehabilitation Act,134
prohibits
Act, 134 which prohibits
discriminating against the disabled,
recipients of federal funding from discriminating
135
including
The ADA extended
extended the antiincluding state Medicaid
Medicaid programs. 135
discrimination
discrimination provisions
provisions of the Rehabilitation
Rehabilitation Act throughout
throughout
American
society,
irrespective
of
whether
the
program
program or activity
American
irrespective
received
received federal funds. And generally, the ADA's and the
same. 136
the same.
terms are
Rehabilitation
Rehabilitation Act's substantive
substantive terms
are the
136
When the ADA was passed, the legal obligation upon Medicaid
Medicaid
programs
to
avoid
discrimination
against
the
disabled
had
already
programs
discrimination
37
been long established by the Rehabilitation
1 Thus, all state and
Rehabilitation Act. 137
F.3d 286, 301 (2d
(2d Cir.
Cir. 2006) (citing
(citing St.
St. Martin
Martin Evangelical Lutheran
Lutheran Church v. South
South Dakota, 451 U.S.
U.S.
772, 788 (1981)).
(1981)).
772,788
133.
U.S.C. § 1210
12101(b)(4)
133. 42 U.S.C.
I (b)(4) (2006).
134.
Stat. 394
394 (1973)
(1973) (codified
(codified at
at 29
29 U.S.C.
U.S.C. § 794
794 (2006)).
(2006)).
134. Pub. L. No.
No. 93-112,
93-112, 87
87 Stat.
135.
135. Id.
Id.
136. Cf Barnes v. Goorman,
Goonnan, 536
536 U.S. 181,
181, 184-85 (2002);
(2002); Lovell
Lovell v. Chandler, 303 F.3d
F.3d 1039, 1052
1052
1995).
(9th Cir.
Cir. 2002);
2002); Helen
Helen L. v.v. DiDario, 46 F.3d
F.3d 325, 331-32 (3d
(3d Cir.
Cir. 1995).
137.
Application of Certain
Certain Cross-Cutting
Cross-CuttingStatutes
Statutes Under
Under the Omnibus
Omnibus Reconciliation
ReconciliationAct of 1981,6
1981, 6
137. Application
U.S.
LEGAL COUNSEL
COUNSEL 83
83 (1982),
availableat 1982
1982 WL
170674.
U.S. OP. OFF.
OFF. LEGAL
(1982), available
WL 170674.
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applicantsfor federal financial assistance were, and
local government applicants
are, required to provide
provide assurances
assurances that they will abide by the
38 In fact, all
Rehabilitation
anti-discrimination provisions. 138
Rehabilitation Act's anti-discrimination
state's
Medicaid state plans must contain specific assurances
assurances that the state's
39 By
Rehabilitation ACt.
Act.'139
By the
Medicaid program will comply
comply with the Rehabilitation
1981, state Medicaid
Medicaid
time the waiver program came
came into existence in 1981,
assurances that they
programs were already
already required to provide assurances
they
would comply with the Act's anti-discriminatory
anti-discriminatory provisions.
Not only had states long been required to operate
operate their Medicaid
Medicaid
program in a manner that avoided discrimination against the disabled,
it was already established law that this compliance
compliance meant avoiding
unnecessary
institutionalization.
The
Rehabilitation
Act's
unnecessary
Rehabilitation Act's
implementing regulations promulgated by the Department
of
Justice
Department
substantially the same
in 1981 contain its own integration mandate, substantially
as in the ADA
ADA regulations:
regulations: "Recipients
"Recipients shall administer programs and
activities
of
activities in the most integrated
integrated setting appropriate to the needs of
140
qualified handicapped
person."'
Thus,
the
integration
mandate
(the
handicapped person.,,140
ADA's version of which would ultimately be the subject of
of
Olmstead) already
Rehabilitation Act when Congress
Olmstead)
already existed in the Rehabilitation
passed the ADA,
ADA, and was already a condition for the receipt
receipt of state
141
14 1
Medicaid
specifically states that its implementing
ADA specifically
Medicaid funds. The ADA
regulations
Rehabilitation Act
regulations should be consistent
consistent with the Rehabilitation
142
regulations.142
ADA records
regulations. In actuality, the legislative history of the ADA
that the integration
integration mandate received bipartisan
bipartisan endorsement. The
referenced the integration mandate in the education
majority report referenced

138. OMB's Standard Form
Form 424B requires an applicant toto certify
certifY that
that he or she "will comply
comply with all
all
Federal statutes relating
relating toto non-discrimination. These include, but
but are not limited toto...
... (c) Section 504
of the Rehabilitation
Rehabilitation Act
Act of 1973, as amended (29 U.S.C. §794),
§794), which
which prohibits
prohibits discrimination on the
handicaps. ....";; see also U. S. OFFICE
OFFICE OF
OF MANAGEMENT
MANAGEMENT BUDGET
BUDGET CIRCULAR A-102
basis of
of handicaps
[hereinafter OMB].
OMB).
139. See Letter from Health
139.
Health Care Fin. Admin.,
Admin., Ctr.
Ctr. for Medicaid and State Operations,
Operations, toto State
Medicaid Director
Director (Aug.
(Aug. 3, 1998).
140.
140. 28 C.F.R. §§41.51(d); see Helen L. v. DiDario, 46 F.3d
F.3d 325, 332-33
332-33 (3d Cir. 1995).
141.
141. This assurance is typically
typically provided
provided inin Section
Section 7.2 of
of each
each state plan for medical
medical assistance
assistance
(Medicaid).
(Medicaid).
142. 42 U.S.C.
U.S.C. §§ 12134(b) (2006).
(2006). Note
Note that
that the statute mistakenly refers to regulations
regulations promulgated
by the Department
Department of Health, Education,
Education, and
and Welfare instead
instead of the
the Department
Department of
of Justice.
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143 Support
integration mandate
mandate echoed
echoed in
in the
the minority
minority
for the integration
context. 1 43 Support
report.
144
report.144
In addition,
addition, the
the "integration
"integration mandate,"
mandate," while enforced
enforced as part
part of
of
In
the ADA
ADA in
in the
the Olmstead decision,
decision, followed
followed aa legislative
legislative judgment
judgment
the
145
Block
Services
Social
the
of
part
as
Grant. 145
made a decade
decade before
before
part of the Social Services Block Grant.
made
Its purpose
purpose tracks
tracks closely
closely the
the integration
integration mandate
mandate as
as applied
applied to
to
Its
specific language
language of the statute states that its
institutionalization. The specific
"preventing or reducing
reducing inappropriate
inappropriate institutional
institutional care
care by
by
goal is "preventing
providing for community-based
community-based care, home based
based care,
care, or other
other
providing
4 6 When
forms of less
less intense
intense care.'
care.,,146
When did
did this provision
provision come
come about?
about? ItIt
came about in 1981,
1981, as part
part of
ofOBRA
1981, the same
same legislation
legislation that
OBRA 1981,
enacted 42 U.S.C.
Medicaid's community
community based
based waiver
waiver
U.S.C. § 1396n, Medicaid's
14 7
Medicaid
Act,
becoming parts of the Social Security
Security Act,147 Medicaid
program, both becoming
149
148 and the
XIX,148
Social Services
Services Block
Block Grant,
Grant, Title
Title XX.
XX. 149
being Title
Title XIX,
same subject
subject
As part of the same legislation, and as part of the same
overarching
provisions should be read together as an overarching
matter, the two provisions
eliminate
to
consistent expression
expression of Congressional intent
consistent
unnecessary institutionalization
institutionalization in federally-funded
federally-funded health care.
unnecessary
In light of this history, it cannot be considered a surprising or novel
of
obligation to enforce
enforce the plain language of
change in a state's legal obligation
with
care
Medicaid Act to provide alternatives to institutional
institutional
the Medicaid
"reasonable
obligation for states to offer non"reasonable promptness."
promptness." The
The obligation
institutional alternative services for their disabled residents was fixed
before the Medicaid
Medicaid waiver program. This program, along with the
Social Security Block Grant program, merely provided funding

the
in the
provided in
must be provided
to children
children with disabilities must
provided to
transportation provided
143.
bus transportation
"The school
school bus
143. ''The
in 1990
1990
reprinted in
Rep.), reprinted
(Conf. Rep.),
most
101-485 (II) (Cont:
No. 101-485
REP. No.
possible." H. REp.
setting possible."
integrated setting
most integrated
369.
267, 369.
U.S.C.A.A.N.
U.S.C.A.A.N. 267,
Act, integrated
integrated services are essential to accomplishing
the Rehabilitation
Rehabilitation Act,
504 of
of the
144.
Section 504
"As with
with Section
144. "As
Skinner, 'the goal is to eradicat[e]
in ADAPT
ADAPT v.v. Skinner,
Mansmann in
the
by Judge
Judge Mansmann
stated by
Title II. As stated
of Titie
the purposes
purposes of
and
do not
not accomplish
accomplish this central goal and
services do
equal services
the
but equal
Separate but
of the
the handicapped.'
handicapped.' Separate
the invisibility
invisibility of
U.S.C.A.A.N. 267, 473 (quoting
1990 U.S.C.A.A.N.
reprinted in 1990
should
(II), reprinted
101-485 (II),
No. 101-485
H. REp.
REP. No.
be rejected."
rejected." H.
should be
dissenting)).
1989) (Mansmann, J., dissenting».
(3d Cir.
Cir. 1989)
1204 (3d
ADAPT v.
F.2d 1184,
1184, 1204
881 F.2d
v. Skinner,
Skinner, 881
1397 (2006).
42 U.S.C.
U.S.C. § 1397
145. 42
145.
146. Id
Id
146.

§§ 1397-1397f(\981».
1397-1397f(1981)).
2352, 95 Stat. 357 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§
97-35, §§ 2352,
L. No.
No. 97-35,
147.
Pub. L.
147. Pub.
(2006).
1396 (2006).
148.
42 U.S.C.
U.S.C. § 1396
148. 42
(2006).
1397 (2006).
42 U.S.C.
U.S.C. §§ 1397
149.
149. 42
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sources for states to effectuate
effectuate Congress's
Congress's anti-discriminatory
anti-discriminatory
sources
mandates
mandates on state
state programs
programs and services.
From the Social Services
Services Block
Block Grant, the Rehabilitation
Rehabilitation Act, and
the ADA, Congress
Congress has
has repeatedly
repeatedly reafflrmed
reaffmned intentions to
de institutionalize our health
health system for our
our disabled residents. As
deinstitutionalize
seen
seen above, discord
discord with this policy
policy arose
arose not from Congress, but
from the Makin decision and its interpretation
interpretation of
of CMS's regulation.
50
have
Since then, various circuit
circuit courts'
courts l50
have issued decisions
decisions along the
lines of Makin, binding
binding in those circuits,
circuits, and CMS itself has clouded
clouded
the issue through
through informal
informal statements made
made in letters issued to state
Medicaid
Medicaid Directors that appear
appear to confuse
confuse CMS's administrative
administrative
with the
applications,
as
asserted
in
this
article,
requirement
in
waiver
requirement
ISI
151
statutory
Medicaid Act.
ACt. Such
Such informal guidance,
statutory mandates of the Medicaid
rule-making procedure
not having gone though
though the administrative
administrative rule-making
procedure set
152
under the Administrative
Administrative Procedure
Procedure Act,
Act,152 and without a source
out under
of statutory
statutory authority, are neither
neither controlling
controlling nor are they
153
persuasive. 153
MAK!N
STATUTORY PROVISIONS
PROVISIONS THAT THE MAKIN
IV. REVIEWING THE STATUTORY
AND
AUTHORIZED
AVOIDING
COURT FOUND "AMBIGUOUS"
"AMBIGUOUS" AND AUTHORIZED AVOIDING THE
"REASONABLE
"REASONABLE PROMPTNESS"
PROMPTNESS" OBLIGATION
OBLIGATION

Makin
What should one make of the statutory provisions
provisions cited by Makin
gap"-which it
"interpretive gap"-which
as ambiguous enough to give rise to an "interpretive

Dep 't of Fin.
Fin. &
& Admin.,
561 F.3d
F.3d 542,
542, 548
150. Language
Language in
in the
Sixth Circuit
Circuit case
case of
150.
the Sixth
of Brown v. Tenn. Dep'l
Admin., 561
also
the issue
issue was
was not
technically before
before the
the Court.
n.4 (6th
(6th Cir.
Cir. 2009),
2009), supports
supports Makin
Makin although
although the
n.4
not technically
Court. See also
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
INTERPRETATION 71
71
AMERICAN STATUTORY
CHRISTIAN E. MAMMEN, USING
USING LEGISLATIVE HISTORY IN AMERICAN
(2002).
(2002).
151. See,
See, e.g., Letter from Health Care Fin. Admin., Ctr. for Medicaid and State Operations, to
151.
to State
State
at 8-9
8-9 (Jan.
10, 2001),
2001), available
available at
http://www.cms.gov/smdl/downloads/
Medicaid Director,
Director, at
Medicaid
(Jan. 10,
al http://www.cms.gov/smdVdownloadsi
smd011001 a.pdf ("Maya
("May a State reduce the total number of people to be
smdOIIOOla.pdf
be served under aa HCBS waiver?"
waiver?"
number of
of un
unduplicated
Yes.
specify the
Yes. Under
Under 42
42 C.F.R. 441.303(f)(6),
441.303(f)(6), states are required to specil)<
the number
duplicated recipients
recipients
to
to be served under HCBS waivers.).
152. S
5 U.S.C.
(2006).
152.
U.S.C. §§ 551-559
551-559 (2006).
153. Heintz
Jenkins, 514 U.S.
153.
Heintz v.v. Jenkins,
U.S. 291, 298 (1995)
(1995) ("We find
find nothing
nothing either in the Act or elsewhere
from the
the Act's
Act's
intended to authorize
authorize the
FTC to
to create
create this
this exception
indicating that
that Congress
Congress intended
indicating
the FTC
exception from
coverage-an exception that falls outside the range of reasonable interpretations of the Act's expressed
coverage--an
language."); Christensen
Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576 (2000).
language.");
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15 4 As noted earlier,
filled with its interpretation
CMS' s regulation? 154
interpretation of CMS's
1396n(c)(9), does not appear to make
U.S.c. § 1396n(c)(9),
the first reference,
reference, 42 U.S.C.
of
"in the case of
such limits mandatory, but makes them permissive,
permissive, "in
any waiver which contains a limit on the number
number of individuals
"155 Because
optional, the language
...... • . ,,155
Because such limits are optional,
language should not be
"reasonable
viewed to override
override the mandatory language of the "reasonable
promptness" obligation. A state using "limits"
promptness"
"limits" can156give effect
effect to both
156
needs.
approximate
to
provisions by setting limits
limits to approximate needs.
The second statutory reference to a limitation is indeed curious, but
"model" waiver program: "The
is considered
considered to apply to the "model"
Secretary shall not limit to fewer than 200 the number of individuals
individuals
in the State who may receive home and community-based
community-based services
1
'
57
It prohibits the Secretary
subsection."
under a waiver under this subsection.,,157
from denying state model waiver applications,
applications, if they have
populations
populations below 200 slots. This provision was, in fact, directly
addressed by CMS in its 1994 regulatory
regulatory history. In distinguishing
the requirements
waiver from the general waiver program,
requirements of a model waiver
Makin:
offered further undermined the reasoning of Makin:
the explanation offered

Secretary's power to limit the
This amendment restricts the Secretary's
community-based
number of persons who can receive home and community-based
waivers to no lower than 200. Again, in light of the history of the
waiver program
program and the legislative history of the provision, we
Secretary's power to
interpret this amendment to restrict
interpret
restrict the Secretary's
program
limit the number
number of participants
participants in the model waiver program
limit
on
the
number
of
there
has
been
no
limit
only. Historically,
Historically,
has
of
and community-based waiver
participants
participants in the regular
regular home and
Federallyprograms,
programs, whereas
whereas there has been a 50 person
person Federallyimposed limit on the number ofpersons
ofpersons who can participate
participate in a
model waiver.
waiver. Also Section 411(k)(10)(A)
411(k)(10)(A) was aimed only at
at
model waivers. We believe, therefore, that this provision
provision enables
the Secretary to limit the number of participants in a model home
154. See discussion supra Part I.B.
U.S.C. § 1396n(c)(9) (2006).
155. 42 u.s.c.
(2006).
1396n(c)(2)(C) (2006).
156.
42 U.S.C. § 1396n(c)(2)(C)
156. 42
(2006).
157.
U.S.C. § 1396n(c)(1O).
1396n(c)(10).
157. 42 u.s.c.
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and
and community-based
community-based program
program to 200
200 persons,
persons, or any
any amount
amount
above
above 200. Through
Through these regulations,
regulations, the Secretary
Secretary has opted
opted to
impose
impose a maximum
maximum limit of 200
200 persons
persons for any state
state waiver
waiver
program
program On
On an individual
individual State
State basis,
basis, an approved
approved State plan
plan
may
contain
a
maximum
limit
that
is
lower
than
200.
Thus,
may contain maximum
Thus, no
State may
may serve
serve any more than
than 200 persons,
persons, but any
any State may
may
be
approved in
be limited to a lower
lower number as approved
in its waiver program
program
comparable limit on regular
regular waiver programs
programs .....
... 158
158
There is no comparable

Could Congress
Congress have
have really
really wanted everyone who could
could meet
meet the
cost neutrality
neutrality criteria to get the option
option of getting alternative
alternative waiver
waiver
services?
services? It appears
appears that CMS
CMS initially thought so, recognizing
recognizing that
Congress intended
intended to cast the broadest
broadest possible net:
The House Report
Report accompanying
accompanying the House
House Omnibus
Reconciliation
Reconciliation Bill (H. Rep. 97-158, p. 316) notes that it has
been estimated that a quarter of the current nursing
nursing home
population
do
not
need
full-time
residential
care.
Many
population
Many elderly,
elderly,
disabled and chronically
chronically ill persons do not need full-time,
chronically ill
residential care. Many elderly, disabled and chronically
persons live in institutions not for medical reasons, but because
of the paucity
services available to them in
paucity of health and social services
their homes of communities,
communities, and the individual's inability to pay
for those services or to have them covered
covered by Medicaid when
1599
15
they do exist.
1915(c)
of
Section 1915(
c) of the Act has a target population
population consisting
consisting of
beneficiaries who are or would be eligible for Medicaid in an
beneficiaries
setting. The statute is not explicit on how
institutional setting.
beneficiaries
beneficiaries are to be determined eligible for new services under
the waiver. However, we believe that Congress did not intend
that there would be a smaller population eligible for Medicaid
Medicaid for

37,702, 37,711 (Sept.
(Sept. 25, 1994)
1994) (emphasis added); see also Bryson v. Shumway,
158. 59 Fed. Reg. 37,702,
308 F.3d 79, 89 (1st Cir.
Cir. 2002).
308
159. 46
46 Fed. Reg.
Reg. 48,532
48,532 (Oct. 1,
1, 1981).
1981).
159.
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home and community-based
community-based services than for institutional long160
term care.
care. 160

Perhaps
Perhaps Congress
Congress may not have fully appreciated
appreciated the growth and
already
Medicaid
if
the
But
of
the
programs.
Medicaid Act already
popularity
mandated that those states providing institutional care to all those
mandated
61-with
requiring such services with reasonable
reasonable promptnessl
promptness l61
-with the
paid out of the federal
federal government-why
being paid
majority of the costs being
would Congress not want states to make equally accessible to such
beneficiaries
considerably less costly and more popular-and
beneficiaries the considerably
If
more consistent with the ADA-waiver
alternative? If
ADA-waiver services as an alternative?
Congress could have been a bit more explicit in making this nowCongress
critically important
important program part of the Medicaid
Medicaid benefit, it is just as
critically
compelling to ask, if Congress
Congress wanted to create the first exception to
compelling
entitlement program, would it not have been more clear about
the entitlement
such a precedent-changing
precedent-changing policy? It could have quite simply waived
that "such assistance be furnished with reasonable
reasonable promptness to all
1
62
eligible individuals.,,162
eligible
individuals."' But it did not; and the regulation that has
or
to find such caps asserts no pretense
Makin
served as the basis for Makin
pretense or
163
163
exception.
an
such
basis for
an exception.
reference numerical limits at all in the statute
Why would Congress reference
nonetheless have to provide services with "reasonable
if states nonetheless
"reasonable
promptness"?
promptness"? These numbers might serve as planning devices for the
purpose
purpose of developing provider capacity; the population limits might
serve as vehicles for developing reasonable standards in care,l64
care, 164 or to
Medicaid
targets---consistent with other Medicaid
allow for capacity
capacity utilization targets-consistent
Or the "population limits" might be simply one way,
provisions.165
165
Or the "population limits" might be simply one way,
provisions.
perhaps the most obvious way, to demonstrate
demonstrate that the waiver
waiver
set
by
Congress.
objective
neutrality"
the
"cost
is
meeting
program
"cost neutrality"
effectiveness be demonstrated on a
Since the statute requires
requires that cost effectiveness

160.
161.
161.
162.
163.
163.
164.
165.
165.

Id.
Id.
See Doe v. Childs, 136 F.3d 709, 718 (11th Cir. 1998).
42
U.S.C. § 1396(a)(8)
42 u.s.c.
1396(a)(8) (2006).
(2006).
See discussion supra
supra Part II.C.
II.C.
42
42 U.S.C. § 1396a(22)(D)
I 396a(22)(D) (2006).
Id.
1396a(3)(A).
Id. § 1396a(3)(A).
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per capita
capita basis,
basis, population
population limits
limits appear
appear to be the most
most facile and
and
per
direct
direct way to demonstrate
demonstrate that the state's
state's waiver
waiver program
program is operating
operating
cost effectively
capita basis, without
without necessarily
necessarily prohibiting
prohibiting
effectively on a per capita
166 In any case, even
increases. 166
even if these cost estimates
estimates are exceeded
exceeded by
by
a state, it is not clear that the state can be in any way penalized:

Secretary may not require
The Secretary
require as a condition
condition of approval
approval of
of a
waiver under
the actual
under this section under paragraph
paragraph (2)(D), that the
total expenditures
community-based services
services under
under
expenditures for home and community-based
the waiver
waiver (and
(and a claim for Federal
Federal financial participation
participation in
approved
cannot
exceed
for
the
services)
expenditures
expenditures
exceed the approved
Federal
estimates
Secretary may not deny Federal
estimates for these services. The Secretary
financial
services under such a waiver
financial payment with respect to services
on the ground that, in order to comply with paragraph 2(D), a
167
such aa requirement.
with such
requirement. 167
State failed to comply with
If Congress
Congress wanted
wanted "hard"
"hard" population
population limits on the waiver
Secretary from
program, it probably would not have prohibited
prohibited the Secretary
participation in states that exceed these
limiting federal financial participation
limits. Much more likely than constraining
constraining the Secretary
Secretary from
denying funding, Congress would have strictly limited federal
contribution to states to the specified
financial contribution
specified cap amount. Thus, the
reference to the limits, whatever
whatever Congress intended
intended by them, does not
statute's plain language,
that,
despite
the
the
further
inference
support
support
inference
Congress intended
intended these services to be denied indefinitely to eligible
beneficiaries.
STATUTORY
V. THE DEFICIT REDUCTION ACT OF 2005: ADDITIONAL
V.
ADDITIONAL STATUTORY
AUTHORITY
AUTHORITY FOR STATES TO PROVIDE COMMUNITY-BASED
COMMUNITY-BASED SERVICES

POPULATION LIMITS
wiTH EXPLICIT POPULATION
WITH

of
Congress appears to have tried to address the limited availability of
community-based services in the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005
community-based
added).
166. [d.
Id. §§ 1396n(c)(2)(D)(emphasis
1396n(c)(2)(D) (emphasis added).
166.
(emphasis added).
167. [d.
Id. §§ 1396n(c)(6)
1396n(c)(6) (emphasis
167.
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168
(DRA).168
many significant
significant changes
changes the
the DRA
DRA made
made to
Among the many
(DRA).
of
community-based
Medicaid,
it
authorizes
states
to
offer
a
new
type
community-based
Medicaid, it authorizes states offer new
services, but with
with several
several critical
critical features that distinguish
distinguish it from the
services,
waiver programs
programs authorized under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396n(c).
1396n(c). The new
new
waiver
program,
U.S.c. § 1396n(i),
1396n(i), permits
permits states to offer
offer
program, codified
codified at 42 U.S.C.
community-based services
services to individuals
individuals that
that do not
not have
have medical
medical
community-based
needs severe
severe enough
enough to meet an institutional
institutional level of care, such as
needs
69 Accordingly, it does away
levels of care.
away
care.'169
nursing home or hospital levels
7°
U.S.c. § 1396n(c).
1396n(c).170
with the "cost
neutrality" requirement
requirement of 42 U.S.C.
"cost neutrality"
with
services to
1396n(c) authorizes
And while 42 U.S.C. § 1396n(c)
authorizes targeting
targeting services
disabilities (such as
conditions, diseases or disabilities
individuals with particular conditions,
individuals with developmental
developmental disabilities), the new program does
individuals
authorize states to limit services to individuals with particular
particular
not authorize
7 1 Significantly, § 1396n(i) explicitly authorizes states
I7I
states to
conditions.
1396n(i) explicitly
conditions.'
72 The
participants in this new
new waiver program.'
program. l72
number of participants
limit the number
conference report to the DRA, in explaining
explaining the new community
community
conference
provisions, discusses, but did not amend, the prebased service provisions,
U.S.C. §§ 1396n(c). In describing the
existing
waiver
waiver
program, 42 U.S.c.
existing
U.S.c. §§ 1396n(c)
1396n(c) waiver, it also interjects upon the issue
existing 42 U.S.C.
that has been the focus of this article.

community-based services
Medicaid's
Medicaid's home and community-based
services (HCBS)
waivers..
waivers . . . allow states to provide home and community-based
community-based
services to Medicaid
Medicaid beneficiaries
beneficiaries who would otherwise need the
provided in a nursing facility, intermediate care
level of care provided
(ICF-MR) or
facility for persons with mental retardation (lCF-MR)
hospital
hospital........ As part of the waiver, states may define services
(e.g., individuals
that will be offered, target a specific population (e.g.,
developmental disabilities) or a specific geographic region,
with developmental

168.
169.
170.
171.
172.

109-171, 120 Stat. 4 (2006).
Pub. L. No. 109-171,
(2006).
Id. § 6086.
Id.
Id.
Id.
4, 2008).
(Apr. 4,
regulations. 73 Fed. Reg. 18,676, 18,691 (Apr.
implementing regulations.
CMS comments to implementing
See eMS
109-171, § 6086, 120
120 Stat. 44 (2006).
Pub. L. No. 109-171,

Published by Reading Room, 2010

43
HeinOnline -- 26 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 845 2009-2010

Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 26, Iss. 3 [2010], Art. 10

846

GEORGIA
GEORGIA STATE
STATE UNIVERSITY
UNIVERSITY LAW
LAW REVIEW
REVIEW

[Vol.
(Vol. 26:3
26:3

and
and limit the number of
of waiver participants
participants (resulting
(resulting in a
73
1
added).
waiting
states) (emphasis
(emphasis added).173
waiting list in many states)

Conference Report have
What effect
effect does the statement
statement in the Conference
have on
1396n(c) waivers? Very little. First, as a
the
of 42 U.S.C. § 1396n(c)
the analysis of
statement
statement in a conference
conference report rather than in the actual
actual statute, the
conference
conference language
language itself
itself does
does not work a legal
legal effect. Statutory
analysis is focused on the
the language
language and terms of the statute.
statute.
Generalized statements
legislative history not "anchored"
"anchored" to
to
statements in legislative
Generalized
particular
particular statutory
statutory language
language offer little for a court
court to consider
consider in the
174
process
"While
process of interpreting
interpreting statutes. 174
"While a committee
committee report may
ordinarily
ordinarily be used to interpret unclear
unclear language
language contained
contained in a statute,
independent statutory source
a committee
committee report
report cannot
cannot serve as an independent
law"'175 Second, even
having the force and effect
effect of law,,175
even if the language
language
was viewed
viewed as an expression
expression of a generalized
generalized statement
statement of
of
"legislative
"legislative intent" of the waiver
waiver statute (irrespective
(irrespective of the actual
language
language it enacted), it is simply too remote in time to be given
given any
report
had
been
submitted
in
consideration. If the conference
conference
reference
original waiver legislation, it perhaps would be
reference to the original
then-Congress's intentions with respect to that
suggestive of the then-Congress's
suggestive
twenty-five years after the waiver
program. But coming nearly twenty-five
waiver
was
hardly
in
program was enacted, the 2006 Conference Committee
Committee
a better position than anyone else to divine what the then-voting
intended when they
legislators that enacted the waiver program intended
author's
passed the legislation, even assuming
assuming this was the report author's
intent. As often noted, "subsequent
"subsequent legislative history provides an
extremely hazardous basis for inferring the meaning
meaning of a

Rep.).
173. H. REp.
REP. No. 109-362,
109-362, at
at 296
(2005) (Cont:
(Conf. Rep.).
173.
296 (2005)
Def. v. Bonneville Power,
174. Nw. Envtl. Def.
Power, 477 F.3d
F.3d 668, 683 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Shannon v.
United States,
States, 512
U.S. 573,
573, 583
583 (1994)).
United
512 U.S.
(1994».
175. Int'l
Int'l Bd. of
175.
of Elec. Workers
Workers Local Union No. 474 v. NLRB,
NLRB, 814 F.2d
F.2d 697,
697, 712 (D.C. Cir. 1987)
effect is
is
omitted). "The
"The principle
principle that
that committee
language has
binding legal
legal effect
(emphasis omitted).
(emphasis
committee report
report language
has no
no binding
grounded in the text of the Constitution and
and in the structure of separated powers the Constitution
section 7,
7, clause
clause 2
2 of
of the
the Constitution
Constitution is
is explicit
explicit about
about the
the manner
manner in
in which
which Congress
Congress
Article I,I, section
created. Article
created.
action." Bonneville Power,
Power, 477
F.3d at
at 684;
684; accord Miedema
Miedema v.
v. Maytag
Maytag Corp.,
Corp.,
can take
take legally
legally binding
can
binding action."
477 F.3d
(11 th Cir.
Cir. 2006)
2006) (arguing
(arguing that
that a
a statute's
statute's silence
silence coupled
coupled with
with a
a sentence
sentence in
in a
a
450 F.3d
F.3d 1322,
1322, 1328
1328 (11th
450
legislative committee report un-tethered to any statutory language does not cause aa change in the law).
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Congressional enactment."
enactment."' !176
as the 109th
109th Congress's
Congress's
16 Third, as
Congressional
of the
the Medicaid
Medicaid waiver
waiver statute,
statute, it has no legal
"interpretation" of
"interpretation"
significance. Congress
Congress enacts
enacts statutes, but interpreting
statutes is not
interpreting statutes
significance.
177
177
constitutional powers.
"Committee report's
report's statements
statements
"Committee
within its constitutional
interpretations'
regarding earlier statutes
statutes cannot
cannot be 'authoritative
'authoritative interpretations'
regarding
because it is the function
function of
of the courts,
courts, and
and not the Legislature
Legislature to say
say
because
78
means."'
statute
means.,,178
enacted
what an enacted
interpreting
for
tools
The
The
interpreting the meaning
meaning of 42 U.S.C
U.S.C
1396n(c)-the statutory language,
§ 1396n(c)-the
language, the Agency's
Agency's interpretation
interpretation of
of
language, the
the judicial
judicial doctrines
doctrines used in statutory
statutory interpretation,
the language,
history-were fixed long ago. This, and
and
relevant legislative
legislative history-were
and the relevant
of
the
the
analysis
alter
committee reports do not meaningfully
meaningfully
future committee
accompanied by legislation amending
amending the
statute unless, and until, accompanied
relevant statutory language. Rather than intending a change
change in the
relevant
law, or changing the analysis of the original law, the statement
statement in the
conference report may be deemed merely as the report author's
author's
conference
recognition of the majority view of the law that clearly follows
recognition
179
However, if Makin was improperly decided, and its legal
Makin. 179 However,
conclusions are determined
detennined to not withstand authoritative
legal
authoritative legal
conclusions
analysis, the report does not abate or absolve such errors.
analysis,
effect of the language of the
Notwithstanding the lack of legal effect
Notwithstanding
Conference Report, does the failure to change the statute after Makin
Conference
acquiescence" to the position espoused
reflect "legislative
"legislative acquiescence"
espoused by Makin?
Makin?
There is scant basis for such an interpretation, as ascribing
ascribing intentions
(1980) (citing
n.13 (1980)
Sylvania, Inc.,
Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 118 n.l3
Safety Comm'n
176. Consumer
Comm'n v.v. GTE Sylvania,
(citing
Prod. Safety
176.
Consumer Prod.
71
note 150,
Red
Lion Broad.
Co. v.v. FCC,
U.S. 367,
367, 380-81
also MAMMEN,
supra note
150, atat 71
MAlMmEN, supra
(1969)); see also
380-81 (1969»;
FCC, 395
395 U.S.
Broad. Co.
Red Lion
of legislative history).
"the least persuasive" form
legislative history
history as
to subsequent
subsequent legislative
(referring
as ''the
form oflegislative
(referring to
Marbury v.
177. While the power of judicial review may originate
originate as
as a constitutional
constitutional doctrine with
with Marbury
of courts
courts and legislatures, it has
the separate
separate authority
authority of
Madison,
of the
doctrine of
of jurisprudence
jurisprudence of
Madison, as
as a
a doctrine
JOHN CHAPMAN
of Europe.
civil law
traditions of
common law
law and
precedents inin both
and civil
law traditions
Europe. See JOHN
CHAPMAN GRAY,
GRAY, THE
both the
the common
precedents
1921).
OF THE
THE LAW
SOURCES OF
NATURE AND SOURCES
NATURE
LAW 170-72 (2d ed. 1921).
1991) (citing
178. Grey Panthers
178.
Panthers Advocacy Comm.
Comm. v.v. Sullivan, 936 F.2d 1284, 1288 (D.C. Cir. 1991)
552, 566 (1988».
(1988)).
U.S. 552,
Pierce v.
v. Underwood,
Underwood, 487
Pierce
487 U.S.
Fin. &
&
Tenn, Dep't of Fin.
so dominant
dominant that in the recent case Brown v. Tenn,
has become
become so
This view
view has
179.
179. This
Circuit dismissed
dismissed an
the Sixth
Sixth Circuit
of Appeals
Admin., 561
561 F.3d
542, 548
n.4 (6th
Cir. 2009),
2009), the
Appeals for
for the
an
the Court
Court of
(6th Cir.
548 n.4
F.3d 542,
Admin.,
deeming itit necessary
list without
without deeming
anticipated
challenge toto the
state's wait
wait list
necessary to cite authority. "We
the state's
anticipated challenge
number of
capped at
at the
the number
acknowledge
enrollment inin the
the waiver
program is
is capped
of slots proposed
proposed by the
waiver program
that enrollment
acknowledge that
Plaintiffs to contend that Tennessee
not take
take the
and we
we do
state
approved by
by CMS,
do not
the Plaintiffs
Tennessee has an
CMS, and
and approved
state and
plaintiffs' position,
enroll eligible
eligible individuals in its HCBS waiver. To the extent that is plaintiffs'
duty to
to enroll
unlimited duty
unlimited
we
reject it
it now."
now." [d.
Id.
we reject
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or meaning
meaning from Congressional
Congressional inaction
inaction is
is an inherently
inherently unreliable
unreliable
or
180
significance
persuasive
"[C]ongressional
silence
lacks
persuasive
significance
exercise.
lacks
"[C]ongressional silence
exercise.
....
quiescent years cannot be invoked
invoked to baptize
baptize a
. . . . The
The verdict
verdict of quiescent
statutory
statutory gloss that is otherwise
otherwise impermissible
impermissible . . .. . Congressional
Congressional
inaction
or
inaction frequently
frequently betokens
betokens unawareness,
unawareness, preoccupation,
preoccupation, or
paralysis
...
,,181
paralysis ... 81
From the passage
passage of a new form of community
community based
based services
services in
in
the DRA one may perhaps
perhaps surmise
surmise that Congress
Congress wanted to give
community based
states
states the option to expand community
based services
services to populations
populations
82
program.
waiver
original
the
under
them
to
access
that do not have
have access them under the original waiver program. 1182
And although the DRA authorizes wait lists, they are in a
significantly different context. These community-based
community-based services
significantly
services are
not subject
subject to the same inherent
inherent limitations
limitations found in the 42 U.S.C
V.S.C
§ 1396n(c)
1396n(c) of cost neutrality, and with eligibility limited to those
While such a wait list may be
meeting an institutional
institutional level
level of care. While
authorized under 42 U.S.C.
1396n(i), that may not be the end of the
V.S.c. § 1396n(i),
authorized
matter with respect to whether
whether a Medicaid
Medicaid program is compliant
compliant with
federal law. This point was noted by CMS in its meticulously
meticulously
reasoned preamble to the new rule:
A State electing to use a waiting list must develop policies for
establishing and maintaining
maintaining the list, if it elects to establish a
served....
.... [W]e would require
limit to the number of individuals served
the State to assure that its policies are published with opportunity
for comment, equitable, and meet all applicable state and federal
Medicaid
requirements. Those requirements
requirements are not limited to Medicaid
provisions
provisions such as timely evaluation and right to a fair hearing;
compliance with the
civil rights protections such as the State's compliance
Americans
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the decisions of the
Olmstead v. L.
L.C.
C. and, in some
United States Supreme Court in Olmstead

MAMMEN, supra
supranote ISO,
150, at
at 7l.
71.
180. MAMMEN,
181. Id
Id. (quoting
(quoting Brown v. Gardner,
Gardner, 513 U.S.
U.S. lIS,
115, 123 (1994)
(1994) (internal citations
citations omitted)).
181.
182. Pub. L.
L. No. 109-171,
109-171, § 6086,
6086, 120
120 Stat. 4 (2006).
182.
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cases, other
other judicial
judicial decisions
decisions or
or procedures
procedures for
for court
court
cases,
3
IS3
monitoring.
monitoring.1
CONCLUSION
CONCLUSION

consequence of
of Makin,
Makin, Medicaid
Medicaid waiver
waiver services
services are a
As a consequence
judicially-created oddity in
in the
the Medicaid
Medicaid program. Up until the new
new
judicially-created
a
legacy
is
itself
arguably
which
DRA,
of
the
program
waiver
waiver service
service program the DRA, which arguably
legacy
Medicaid's community-based
community-based waiver
waiver program
program was the
the only
only
of Makin, Medicaid's
service among
among a lengthy
lengthy list of services
services authorized
authorized under
under the
service
Medicaid program that states can
can elect
elect to deny to individuals who
who are
Medicaid
a
"noneffectively,
as
qualified
and
eligible
to
receive
effectively,
them,
receive
qualified and
entitlement" service. Despite
Despite this, the
the waiver
waiver program
program is among the
entitlement"
and by
by its very definition, cost-effective.
cost-effective. As
most popular programs, and
a result, Medicaid
Medicaid recipients
recipients are often caught
caught between
between a service they
do not want, and a service
service they cannot get. This uncomfortable
uncomfortable state
of affairs disproportionately
disproportionately harms those with disabilities nearly four
decades after Congress
Congress enacted
enacted anti-disability
anti-disability discrimination
discrimination
of the disabled in society.
legislation and called for the integration ofthe
"reasonable
To say that waiver services
services must be provided with "reasonable
promptness"
promptness" does not mean that services must be immediate, but is
suggestive of an individualized
Reasonable
individualized factual inquiry. Reasonable
184
promptness generally means ninety (90) days.184
days. Under the statute, it
not. But if they do, giving
appears
that
states
may
set
caps,
or
may
appears
effect to the reasonable promptness provision means requiring the
estimates of need for the services in
caps to be based on reasonable estimates
the state, and eliminating the practice of denying services for eligible
individuals for undetermined, indefinite periods. Applying the
reasonable promptness language
language would go a long way towards
bringing the promise of Olmstead
Olmstead to fruition and bringing to an end a
to curtail the use of health facilities as
struggle to
multi-generational struggle
with disabilities.
those
vehicles for segregating

(Apr. 4, 2008).
73 Fed.
Fed. Reg. 18,676, 18,679 (Apr.
183. 73
183.
1998).
(11th Cir.
Cir. 1998).
136 F.3d 709
709 (II
Childs, 136
184. Doe
Doe v. Childs,
184.

Published by Reading Room, 2010

47
HeinOnline -- 26 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 849 2009-2010

Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 26, Iss. 3 [2010], Art. 10

850

GEORGIA
GEORGIA STATE
STATE UNIVERSITY
UNIVERSITY LAW
LAW REVIEW
REVIEW

[VoL
(VoL 26:3

As
As the
the American
American health
health system
system moves
moves from an
an institutional model
model
to a less costly and
more
consumer-directed
focus,
Makin
stands
and more consumer-directed focus,
stands as a
stubborn anachronism. It limits consumer
consumer choice
choice and perpetuates
perpetuates the
stubborn
discriminatory effects of
discriminatory
of an institutionalized
institutionalized health
health care
care system that
to the past. It is time that Makin's
Congress has sought to relegate
relegate
85
holding be
be reconsidered.
reconsidered. 1185

185. Neil Johnson, Home Care/or
Carefor Seniors
Seniors Has
Urgency, MINNEAPOLIS STAR-TRIBUNE,
STAR-TRIBUNE, Jan. 6,
185.
Has New Urgency,
2008, http://www.startribune.com/business/12995121.html.
http://www.startribune.comlbusinesslI299512I.html. Ironically Hawaii appears to be one of the
Makin has no lingering effect, at least with respect to the developmentally disabled.
few places where
where Makin
developmentally disabled in institutions,
The state is now one of the few that has ended all care for the developmentally
community-based services.
services. It is
is reported to have no one waiting
waiting for services
services under
under its
and only provides community-based
BRAGDON, supra
supranote 33, at S.
5.
waiver. See BRAGDON,
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APPENDIX
APPENDIX I

The agency
agency must furnish
furnish HCFA
HCF A with
with sufficient
sufficient information
information to
support the assurances
assurances required
required by § 441.302. Except
Except as HCFA
RCF A may
may
consist
otherwise specify
specify for particular
particular waivers,
waivers, the information
information must consist
of the following,
following, at a minimum:
the safeguards
safeguards necessary
necessary to protect the
the health
(a) A description
description of the
and welfare
welfare of recipients. This
This information
information must include
include a copy
of the standards established
established by the State for facilities that are
1616(e)
covered by section 1616(
e) of the Act.
(b) A description
description of the records
records and information that will be
maintained to support financial accountability.
maintained
accountability.
evaluation and
(c)
agency's plan
plan for the evaluation
(c) A description of the agency's
reevaluation of recipients,
recipients, including--(1)
including-{l) A description of who
reevaluation
will make
make these
these evaluations
evaluations and how they will be made; (2)
(2) A
evaluation instrument
copy of the evaluation
instrument to be used; (3) the agency's
agency's
procedure to ensure the maintenance
procedure
maintenance of written documentation
documentation
on all evaluations and reevaluations;
reevaluations; and (4) the agency's
agency's
procedure to ensure reevaluations
procedure
reevaluations of need at regular intervals.
agency's plan for informing
informing eligible
(d) A description of the agency's
recipients of the feasible alternatives
alternatives available
available under the waiver
institutional services or
and allowing recipients to choose
choose either institutional
or
community-based services.
home and community-based
(e) An explanation
(e)
explanation of how the agency will apply the applicable
provisions regarding the post-eligibility treatment of income and
individuals receiving home and communityresources of those individuals
resources
based services who are eligible under a special income level
(included
(included in section 435.217 of this chapter).
(f) An explanation
explanation with supporting documentation satisfactory
satisfactory to
HCFA
HCF A of how the agency estimated the per capita expenditures
for services. This information must include but is not limited to
services included in
the estimated utilization rates and costs for services
projected beds in Medicaid
the plan, the number of actual and projected
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ICF/MRs by type, and evidence
certified SNFs,
SNFs, ICFs, and ICFIMRs
evidence of the
need for additional
additional bed capacity in the absence of the waiver.
(1) The annual average
average per capita expenditure
expenditure estimate
estimate of the
cost of home and community-based
community-based and other Medicaid services
under the waiver
waiver must not exceed the annual
annual average per capita
expenditures
services in the absence of a waiver.
expenditures of the cost of services
The estimates
estimates are to be based on the following equation:
(AxB)+(A'xB')+(CxD)+(C'xD')+(HxI)
(AxB)+(A'xB ')+(CxD)+(C'xD ')+(HxI)

(FxG)+(HxI)+(F'xG')
(FxG)+(HxI)+(F'xG')

<=
F+H

F+H
F+H

where:
A =
= the estimated
estimated annual number of beneficiaries
beneficiaries who would
receive
the
level
of
care
provided
in
an
SNF, ICF, or ICF/MR
SNF,
ICFIMR
receive
with the waiver.
B = the estimated
expenditure for SNF,
SNF, ICF, or
estimated annual Medicaid expenditure
or
ICF/MR
ICFIMR care per eligible
eligible Medicaid user with the waiver.
C =
= the estimated annual number of beneficiaries
beneficiaries who would
would
receive home and community-based
community-based services
services under the waiver.
D =
expenditure for home and
= the estimated annual Medicaid
Medicaid expenditure
community-based
community-based services per eligible Medicaid
Medicaid user.
F =
= the estimated
annual
number
beneficiaries who would
estimated
number of beneficiaries
SNF, ICF, or
likely receive the level of care provided
provided in an SNF,
ICF/MR in the absence
absence of the waiver.
ICFIMR
estimated annual Medicaid
Medicaid expenditure per eligible
G = the estimated
Medicaid user of such institutional care
care in the absence
absence of the
waiver.
H =
= the estimated
estimated annual number
number of beneficiaries
beneficiaries who would
receive
receive any of the noninstitutional,
noninstitutional, long-term care services
services
otherwise provided under the State plan as an alternative to
institutional care.
= the estimated annual Medicaid
Medicaid expenditure
expenditure per eligible
I =
noninstitutional services referred to in H.
Medicaid user of the noninstitutional
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The
The symbol
symbol "less
"less than/equal
than/equal to"
to" is intended
intended to
to mean
mean that the
result
result of the left side
side of the
the left side of the
the equation
equation must be less
than or
the equation.
or equal
equal to the result of the right side of the
A'
A' =
= the
the estimated
estimated annual
annual number
number of beneficiaries
beneficiaries referred
referred to
to in
A who would receive
receive any of the acute
acute care
care services
services otherwise
otherwise
provided
provided under
under the State plan.
B' = the estimated
B'
estimated annual
annual Medicaid
Medicaid expenditure
expenditure per eligible
eligible
Medicaid
Medicaid user
user of the acute
acute care
care services
services referred
referred to in A'.
A'.
C' == the estimated annual
C'
annual number of beneficiaries
beneficiaries referred
referred to in
would receive
receive any of
of the acute
acute care
care services
services otherwise
otherwise
C who would
provided
provided under
under the State plan.
D' =
= the estimated
estimated annual Medicaid
Medicaid expenditure
expenditure per eligible
C'..
Medicaid user of acute
Medicaid
acute care services referred
referred to in C'
annual
number
of
beneficiaries
F'
=
the
estimated
F'
estimated
number beneficiaries referred to in F
acute care services otherwise
who would receive any of the acute
provided under
under the State plan.
estimated annual
annual Medicaid
Medicaid expenditure
expenditure per eligible
eligible
G' = the estimated
Medicaid
user
of
the
acute
care
services
referred
to
in
F'.
Medicaid
ofthe
referred
F'.
(2)
(2) For purposes of the equation,
equation, acute care services means all
services
services otherwise provided
provided under the State plan that are neither
neither
ICF/MR services, nor the noninstitutional,
noninstitutional, longSNF, ICF, or ICFIMR
term care services referred
to
in
H.
referred
(3)
(3) Data on the estimated
estimated annual
annual number of beneficiaries
beneficiaries and
expenditures for those who would otherwise receive an SNF,
ICF/MR level of care is required for all three types of
of
ICF, or ICFIMR
provides
that
each
of
these
institutions only if the waiver request
community-based services. For
groups will be offered home and community-based
For
example, if the request does not include persons who would
ICF/MR level of care, the State is not
otherwise receive an ICFIMR
required
to
furnish
data
on that group.
required
of
(4) The data must show the estimated annual number of
beneficiaries who will be deinstitutionalized
deinstitutionalized from certified SNFs,
beneficiaries
ICF/MRs because they would receive home and
ICFs and ICFIMRs
community-based
community-based services under the waiver, and the estimated
annual number of beneficiaries
beneficiaries whose admission to such
institutions would be diverted or deflected because of the waiver
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For the
the latter
latter group,
group, the
the State's
State's evaluation
evaluation process
process
services. For
required
required by
by section
section 441.303(c)
441.303(c) must
must provide
provide for
for a more
more detailed
detailed
description
of their
their evaluation
evaluation and screening
screening procedures
procedures for
for
description of
limited
will
be
recipients to assure
assure that
that waiver
waiver services
services
be limited to
to
recipients
persons who
who would
would otherwise
otherwise receive
receive the level
level of care
care provided
provided
persons
in
in an SNF,
SNF, ICF,
ICF, or
or ICF/MR.
ICFIMR.
(g) Except
Except as HCFA
RCF A may
may otherwise
otherwise specify
specify for particular
particular
assessment
waivers, the
the agency
agency must provide
provide for an
an independent
independent assessment
waivers,
of its waiver
waiver that
that evaluates
evaluates the
the quality
quality of care
care provided, access
access to
care, and
and cost-effectiveness.
cost-effectiveness. The
The results
results of the assessment
assessment must
care,
be submitted
submitted to HCFA
RCF A at least
least 90 days prior to the third
anniversary
anniversary of the approved
approved waiver
waiver period
period and
and cover at least
least the
waiver.
first 24 months of the waiver.
17, 1985]
[50 FR 10027,
10027, March 13,
13, 1985;
1985; 50 FR 25080,
25080, June
June 17,
1985]
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